

Free-will in Consciousness

Tebbetts

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
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FREE-WILL IN CONSCIOUSNESS : AN ETHICAL POSTULATE.

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of Philosophy.

of the

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For the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

By

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- I. Introduction.
- II. Nature of the Question:
 - A. Antinomies of the Reason per se devoid of general interest
 - B. Re-enforced by Ethical and Religious implications general interest grows apace,
 - (a) becomes intense in proportion to the prevalence of metaphysical elements yet
 - (b) ebbs and flows, primarily, with the ebb and flow of the of the implications.
- III. The Rational bond of humanity being a Moral one, human interest arises out of some form of Moral Renaissance or subjective awakening.
 - A. Christianity, a signal awakening of the Collective Moral Consciousness
 - (a) emphasized Ethico-religious elements already existing as well as
 - (b) originated others peculiar to itself, and
 - (c) as Reflective, gave rise to metaphysical contradictions, necessarily complex.
 - B. Free-will, though involving a metaphysical contradiction and at times highly complex, bears throughout its history marks of its origin.
 - (a) Its function, as moral appears in its Theologic not more than in its Philosophic and Psychologic stages.
 - (b) Its formula--~~none~~ assertive--is not Freedom demand but Freedom is demanded; for
 - C. Neutral Freedom is demanded:
 - (a) By Theology, as awakened moral consciousness to explain the existence of Evil
 - (1) Evil incongruous as flowing from an all Good Cause
 - (2) A "second cause" is interposed to bear the onus of Evil.
 - (b) By Philosophy, as Reflective moral consciousness to explain Morality as such:
 - (1) An uncompromising Law of Duty, its primary postulate.
 - (2) Freedom is made the ratio essendi of Duty.
 - (c) By Psychology, as scientific moral consciousness to explain Character in Man
 - (1) determined by environment and heredity
 - (2) held responsible for his acts and character.

IV. Freedom in Consciousness:

A. Reached Philosophical expression in the Philosophy of the Conditioned

(a) Sir William Hamilton following Kant, postulated:

(1) An uncompromising Law of Duty, --and

(2) Freedom, its ratio essendi.

(b) exceeding Kant he sought to remove the contradiction by giving to

(1) Causality a negative value

(2) Freedom a positive value, as immediate datum of consciousness.

(c) weakened the cause of Freedom by the

(1) Laudable but too evident "intention" to save Freedom.

(2) Withdrawal of Freedom from its own ideal realm of appreciation, --and

(3) Attempt to give it a scientific basis in the world of Description.

B. Subjected to a rigid Examination by the Associationalist school of Psychology

(a) John Stuart Mill took issue with the Philosophy of the Conditioned as it treated

(1) What is Consciousness,

(2) What its testimonies, if any: what its Primary Truths.

(b) found that

(1) Consciousness is Experience: its primary truths products of Experience.

(2) The Moral Law, such a product, has its genesis in sensation inseparably associated

(c) yet conceded that

(1) Our character is made by us and not for us, -

(2) and that

(2) In some way, our Desires are "our own."

C. Approached by later Psychologists through an analysis of phenomena of Will: evidence for Freedom has been sought in the phenomena of

(a) Deliberation, as evidencing

(1) A break in the series of efficient causes;

(2) The advent of a Final cause which is free cause

(b) Attention -- Apperceptive process as evidencing

(1) Power of arrest over trains of association: selection and appropriation of congruous elements.

(2) Re-combination of such into Ideal Constructions.

(c) Feeling of Effort, as evidencing

(1) Abolition of law of mechanical action: action in the line of least resistance

(2) Substitution of a new law: action in the line of greatest resistance.

V. Conclusion.

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FREE-WILL IN CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ETHICAL POSTULATE.

I

"I knew as well that I had a will as that I lived:when then I did will or nill anything I was most sure that no other than myself did will or nill;and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin.

But what I did against my will I saw that I suffered rather than did and I judged to be not my fault but my punishment."

Confessions of Saint Augustine, Book, VII, (III.) 5.

A problem once solved falls from a point of interest to the level of fact never to rise again except as material or at most a factor, one of many, in the solution of a new problem.

What then of problems that run on through the ages unsolved, having phases of expanding and narrowing interest, to be sure, but never reaching the state of solution.^d

Are they problems unsolved simply or are they insoluble problems? Do they persist as barren survivals or by virtue of some indestructible force that is in them?

Were not metaphor obsolete and "animism" primitive, one might ascribe to the mighty force of evolution something of intelligent purpose in holding for ages before the philosophic consciousness puzzling problems of knowledge and

will, warding off, as it were, hasty solutions.

As Ideal Instruction in the person of SOCRATES aimed not to solve but to question, to object, and to parry, content, by a hundred artifices, to hold before the pregnant mind of the instructed this or that worthy problem until its every aspect and relation had been presented, and until every activity of that mind had been called forth, so an Eternal World-consciousness (if such there were) might be supposed to deal with conscious beings--the problems it presented being not, in any absolute sense, insoluble but only waiting solution indefinitely--their purpose, discoverable gradually only and as tendency.

To pass in review one such question is the purpose of this paper.

II

As a general remark it may be allowed that from the dawn of speculation, splendid intellectual force and subtlety has spent itself on so-called insoluble problems, often, with a lavishness out of all proportion to the value of the result, actual or possible.

Mere pursuit yields its own unique pleasure; to furnish which a whole class of such problems, bare of human interest, wears no disguise. Their difficulty is their *raison d'etre* and this is laid open directly to the analysis of logical thinkers.

Whether Achilles ever catches the tortoise or whether the adventurous being who attempts it ever reaches the end of his endless line seem, on the face of it, problems of not vital importance in a life that is short, and men in general leave the resolution of them to be the secret (1) joy of solitary thinkers.

Let the house of metaphysicians and mathematicians divide itself against itself, if it will, in determining just what is the composition of a line and whether, in an infinite series, there is a "negligible" or not, it is safe to predict that it will not so divide a world as it has not so divided it in the past.

Mathematical antinomies fail of wider interest, not, we may suppose, because of the metaphysical difficulty involved--alluring enough in itself--but for the reason that their subject-matter has a zero tone of feeling for the empirical Ego of most people.

In exceptional cases there may be an ulterior motive urging to solution, other than the merely intellectual: see "Conception of the Infinite", (George S. Fullerton.) Preface, where such a motive is admitted though not emphasized.

On the other hand, a metaphysical problem of like difficulty has only to ally itself to deep human interests to insure a wide-spread and passionate espousal of one or the other horn the dilemma and to bend to its solution lofty and serious minds as well as those of logical acumen.

Although antinomies of the reason per se, it must be admitted, are devoid of that general interest which gives momentum to a question; yet when re-inforced by ethical and religious implications the same awaken such interest in a marvellous way as the history of Doctrine abundantly shows. Once awakened, it grows apace, is augmented and motivated in a thousand ways; and becomes, strangely enough, intense in proportion to the prevalence of the metaphysical elements; yet ebbs and flows, primarily, with the ebb and flow of the implications.

III

The cause of this swelling tide of interest is not far far to seek, nor its conditions difficult to determine.

The Rational bond of humanity being a moral and social one, the deep human-interest-element referred to can arise only out of some form of Moral Renaissance or general Subjective awakening. This given as an antecedent, from the nature of the case complex questions, semi-abstract, will almost of themselves evolve out of the attempt of the awakened consciousness to adjust to an outer system of things its own newly discovered or newly enforced possibilities.

A strenuous temper ensues and a "high" seriousness offering therein the strongest possible contrast to that of pure metaphysics which when freed from social bonds, is freed to that extent from inner urgency toward solution.

Christianity, as such a Moral Renaissance, emphasised ethico-religious elements already existing; and, by virtue of tenets peculiar to itself, ~~it~~ originated others; the new in some cases becoming interwoven with the old.

The new spirit informed and sought to re-form the philosophy of the Schools; thus it happens, ^{that} this particular form of moral Renaissance, as it became reflective, gave rise, when to metaphysical contradiction, to metaphysical

(U) contradictions⁺ necessarily complex.

To this class belongs the question of Free-Will—

So interwoven indeed with ancestral ethical and animistic elements and special theological implications has been the underlying difficulty of this question, in the course of its history, as almost to defy analysis and to give a certain congruity to Milton's selection of time and place and supernatural agents for the discussion

"Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will and Fate,

"Fixed Fate, Free-Will, Foreknowledge absolute"

and some color to the admission that even they

"Found no end in wandering mazes lost."

Augustinianism and Pelagianism, Thomism and Scotism, Calvinism and Arminianism, horns of this dilemma of Free-Will exhibit the maximum of general interest in the question as well as the maximum of its theological implications.

(U) ⁺ A brief treatment of questions of this kind from the point of view of Catholic theology may be found in "Truth and Counter-Truth", a suggestive little book by Thomas Richey, D.D. (Pott & Amery, New York.)

They are, in fact, summations on a metaphysical base of human interests, pessimistic and optimistic, and remain ~~is~~ ⁺ constructive and memorable, not for their reconciliations or half-solutions of the questions at issue but for their testimony as to what are the deep chords of human life and how vibrant they are though wrongly struck.

In this signal Renaissance, the Moral Consciousness, ^{and} awakened, semi-reflective, had, it is plain, first to meet as its necessary correlate the fact of Evil.

Evil Theology found incongruous in connection with an All-Good Essence as Cause and, in its own interest, demanded a break in this causal nexus, a check as it were upon

⁺ The most interesting of such reconciliations and the one affording most subjective satisfaction, perhaps, to one not yet inured to the "mechanical philosophy" is that of Tertulian who distinctly and philosophically recognised a created will which was yet an original cause in nature.

His argument occurs concisely stated in the polemic Adv. Marc. L2, c. 6, and has been paraphrased by Mozley thus: "Originality is the highest form of being; and every ^{thing} which does not move itself whatever be its grandeur or sublimity as a spectacle is intrinsically despicable in comparison with that which does. The Divine Power then, resolving upon its own highest exertion chose originality itself as a subject of creation and made a being which when made was in its turn truly creative- the author and cause of its own motions and acts. And whereas the creature would as such have possessed nothing of his own God by an incomprehensible act of liberality alienated good from Himself in order that the creature might be the true proprietor of it and exhibit a goodness ^{which} HIS own will was the sole cause. And this redounded ultimately to God's Glory for the worthiest and noblest creature must know Him best."

See "The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination" p. 24

Omnipotence and this it found in a "second cause" whose function it was to intervene between Evil and Absolute Goodness and as free and responsible to bear the onus of Evil. This second cause was Man, the creature, endowed with Free-will by Will-limiting Omnipotence.

Note here that it was a Moral Demand on the part of Theology that gave rise to the conception of free-will; and a Moral Demand alone, it may be shown, that has sustained it and caused it to arise again and again as often as it seemed about to succumb to the rigor of Logic: the key-note thus struck by Theology appearing with more or less stress in each well-marked phase of its history.

So much seems clear and the thesis defensible that the function of this doctrine has been from its rise a moral one; that its formula, from the beginning non-positive, if not absolutely negative, has been not Freedom demands but Freedom is demanded: that, in short, the Moral Consciousness whether awakening, as in Theology; reflective, as in Philosophy; or scientific, as in Psychology; has, each phase in its different way, demanded ⁽¹⁾ Neutral Freedom as the ratio essential of Rational Freedom.

For Sidgwick's distinction of these terms: neutral, rational, capricious, - see "Freedom as found in Kant" .

But non-assertive, 'υποταγή', "suffiction", as it was,
Free-will was not allowed to stand unchallenged even by
the Theology that had invoked it. For "second causes", it
was thought, reflect upon the Prescience of God no less
than Evil upon His Goodness.

The solution of one difficulty only unfolded another;
the latter as grave as the former. Grave enough since
"God without Fore-knowledge" could be represented as contin
ually grieved, subject to an infinite number of disappoint
ments, to manifold, constant, and great perplexity; as contin
ually repenting, changing His Mind, altering His measures,
relinquishing old designs and forming new; as one, in fact,
continually putting His System to rights, out of order
through the contingency of the actions of moral agents.
such a God being manifestly no God, the Fore-knowledge of
+ God is proved and the contingency of moral agents disprov

◇ Thus represented by the devout Edwards: see "Free-dom of
the Will", Sect. xI Argument III, IV, V, of which what follows
is an altogether inadequate paraphrase.

+ "Cet argument" says Voltaire, "de la Prescience de Dieu, &
s'il avait quelque force contra la libere de l'homme, de-
truirait encore egalment celle de Dieu: car si Dieu pre-
voit tout ce que arrivera, il n'est donc pas en son pouvoi
de ne pas faire ce qu'il a prevu qu'il ferait."

Cor. avec le Roi de Prusse, Lettre 32 Sur la liberte.

ed.

Whether Infinite knowledge must be indeed so curtailed by Finite contingency, or is, on the contrary, quite consistent with it, is a question aside from the present purpose.

Suffice it, that early in its history Theism threw out a dilemma marvellously like the dilemma of Determinism of to-day, - except that the prototype besides being a dilemma was a complex of scriptural and traditional reasonings as well and offered a fertile field for discussion, futile, in no sense fruitful, but withal a means, if not of grace, of dialectic. ⁽¹⁾

Under the strain and stress of controversy, all become logical, even the illogical, to the extent at least of drawing out of their premises all they contain: it is a chance indeed, if there is not drawn from them even more than there is in them, much as the grave-digger in Hamlet argued an act to have three branches, "to act, to do, and to perform," and from this premise drew large conclusions.

That extravagant statements and general hair-splitting should result and the issue itself take exaggerated shape is, on the whole, less surprising than that it should not. Asiatic Fatalism, predestination from the foundation of the world, on the one side, and the Free-will of Indifference on the other, was, it must be granted, hyperbolic defini-

(1) How little a means of grace, see Note, U Hamilton's Dissertation on Reid's Active Powers, p. 975.

inition:but bad as it is as definition it was yet better than confusion and brought its own compensation. From much and various threshing it was inevitable that some chaff should fall,some body of truth grow clearer.

One by one,"caudaeque pilos ut equinae Paulatim,"confused and irrelevant propositions fell or were drawn from this complex until in Philosophical Necessity,the content of Predestination was set forth as a principle,pessimistic and "hard"indeed,but positive,clearcut,capable of logical statement,and regardant of facts.

To this dismalest,"out of the depths"song of bondage Human Freedom,Moral Freedom,set to no logic and to no facts--except a subjective one of feeling-- offered a true antithesis and,as it were,to borrow a phrase from Saint Augustine,an"antiphonic refrain". Regardant of Ideals,positive only in being protestant,the doctrine of Freedom waited on that of Necessity for such definition as it was forced to.

It accepted,in short,a negative rôle so far,at least, as proof on an objective basis was concerned,and entrenched itself with peculiar firmness on a ground,subjective and conservative as well of certain deep human interest

11 See Civitas Dei,Lib.XI ch.xviii where it is used of Evil,as the necessary correlate of Goodness:without the contrast offered by Evil,Absolute Goodness,he argues, could not be known or conceived.

elements.

Now Reason brooding over these subjective waters and at tempting some explanation of Morality as such found mirrored here its primary postulate, an unconditioned, supreme Law of Duty and itself declared the ratio essendi of this Law of duty, as unconditioned, to be Freedom. Here again, note, Freedom appears as a presupposition or "suffiction" of Reason, having its ratio cognoscendi vested in a principle other than itself yet claiming to be undetermined by that other.

The Kantian proposition: the Moral Law is the Law of Freedom may need ample qualification, interpretation perhaps, and re-adjustment to wider knowledge yet furnishes a point of view from which aspects of the question may be studied with profit.

IV

It was now that the long-hidden contradiction came distinctly into view. Over against an "infinite regress", a "chain of causation going back to all eternity" was set "an uncaused commencement" and the contest recommenced on this clearer ground. How hopeless the struggle for either reconciliation or supremacy has been graphically sketched by Sir William Hamilton in a comment of his on Reid's "Active Powers", which sketch is expressive of not more but

less than the truth may bear quoting in full.

"As we cannot compass in thought an undetermined cause --an absolute commencement--the fundamental hypothesis of the one;so we can as little think an infinite of determined causes--of relative commencements--the fundamental hypothesis of the other. The champions of the opposite doctrines are thus at once resistless in assault and impotent in defence. Each is hewn down and appears to die under the home-thrust of his antagonist, and to borrow a simile, both are like the heroes in Valhalla, ready in a moment to amuse themselves anew in the same bloodless and interminable contest."

In his masterly analysis of the Freedom of the Will, Edwards had demonstrated an undetermined will to be inconceivable. Hamilton admits the proof but in turn predicates "inconceivable" of "infinite regress" as well; both are alike inconceivable and inconceivable in the same sense of the word. That the one is less obtrusive through being infin-

(v) Eighth Edition, p. 602.

Huxley hazards the opinion that this battle will forever remain a "drawn one" for the reason, seemingly, that while the matter has been in dispute for nearly 2000 years the disputants have not yet come in sight of a settlement.

(2) See "Freedom of the Will", Part II Sections I, III.

(3) According to Mill, Hamilton uses "inconceivable" in three senses. See Examination of the Phil. of the Conditioned". 86-8 p. (New York 1884.)

itely removed does not alter the character of the conception. Inconceivable being thus common to both hypotheses and not operating more against one than the other does not operate against either. As "equally unthinkable" the two schemes are thus theoretically balanced--balanced, that is, so far as *a priori* probability is concerned and are, at this stage of the statement, together as bare of interest, extraneous to the difficulty of conceiving, as any mathematical antinomy of them all,--and would offer, as alternatives in equilibrio, a nearly perfect condition for an ideally "free" act of choice, were it not for certain facts which make for or against the respective theories.

Practically, then, they seem not so nicely balanced since, on one hand, "our consciousness of the Moral Law", according to Sir William Hamilton, gives a decided preponderance for the doctrine of Freedom"; while, on the other, it may be said, Experience gives as decided a preponderance--but of Experience, more anon.

"In favor of Freedom", says Sir William, "we have the distinct testimony of consciousness"; directly, perhaps, but "at all events indirectly in the consciousness" of Freedom implying Moral Responsibility. "We are free if we are ac-

countable for our act."

So strong to his mind is this evidence furnished by consciousness that he does not hesitate to say "The fact that we are free is given in the consciousness of an uncompromising Law of Duty.....and this fact of Liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible."

This testimony of consciousness is, we shall find, supreme over all sorts and conditions of the inconceivable - not only over that equated one of "absolute commencement" but over certain other inconceivable or contradictory elements in the shape of a will, free and indetermined yet determined and known to be "determined by motive", - and of "unmotivated volitions" which shall yet have moral value.

In the toils of twin inconceivables and their complications he exclaims: "Nay were we even to admit as true what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motive-less volition would be only casualism, and the free acts of an indifferent are, morally and rationally, as

(1) On Reid's Active Powers, Note U, p. 975: also Lectures II. Sir William Hamilton here distinctly to take the Kantian position that it is the Moral Law alone that is immediately given, Liberty being only its ratio essendi. Elsewhere he is less clear on this point.

Spinoza's view of the free and indetermined will as a concept formed from particular volitions seems to have received no notice from Hamilton: it appears, however, as a sufficient explanation of the conception in Sully "Genesis of Free-will Doctrine." Sensation and Illusion ch. VI.

(2) On Reid's Active Powers, p. 974-975.

10 worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined will. Now, there, I repeat, Moral Liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable speculative-ly to understand."

Dead Sea fruit thus results in either case, reason seems to avow, whether we accept the scheme of Necessity or of Freedom.-Nevertheless, "one is true" and "if our intellectual nature be not alie, if our consciousness and our conscience do not deceive us in the immediate datum of an absolute Law of Duty (to say nothing of an immediate datum of Liberty itself) we are free as we are moral agents: for morality involves Liberty as its essential condition, as its ratio essendi."

With an admirable impartiality Hamilton dwells upon the inconceivability of Free-will especially upon the futility of all attempts to render it so; declares that we can conceive, that is, think only the determined and the relative, and finally demonstrates quite satisfactorily that

(1) It is difficult to reconcile the disconnection of free and moral acts implied in such expressions as this with the assumed self-evident connection of Free-will and Responsibility elsewhere observable in the writings of Sir William Hamilton. In this "immediate datum of Liberty itself", Hamilton consciously ventures beyond Kant: claiming that Kant erred in his treatment of Free will "for he ought to have regarded it" (this feeling or beleif which was its proof) "not as a mere spiritual craving but as an immediate manifestation to intelligence; not as a postulate but as a datum; not as an interest in certain truths, but as the fact, the principle, the warrant of their cognition and reality" Note A Dissertation Reid. Hamilton has his prototype in this respect in Ochino, whose Labyrinthine one might suppose, served in this reduction of Freewill doctrine to its lowest terms.

that all roads, even the least evident, lead to Necessity. Possibly he at times shared ⁱⁿ James' feeling that this doctrine of Freewill "ought" not to be proved or forced "willy nilly down indifferent throats," but that "Freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself." Whether this was his "subconscious" feeling or not, it is certain that he with ardor "saves his opponents the trouble of answering his friends" and demolishes with trenchant force all current arguments for it except the one on which he conceives its support to rest, namely, the "immediate datum" above referred to. Nor is the counter-datum of causality forgotten: for lest one entertain the suspicion of a theological, scholastic, or other "intention", which in the eyes of Schopenhauer has marred so much good reasoning in the past; and as if to anticipate such an interpretation of Liberty as immediate datum he expressly says that to "exempt certain phenomena from this universal law" (of causation) "for the sake of our moral consciousness cannot validly be done", for if causality and Freedom be "equally positive dictates of consciousness" there can be no ground for subordinating one of these dictates to the other, - and especially would we

See Psychology Vol. II p. 573: also Dilemma of Determinism, Uni. Review? Sept. 1884.

have no right to subordinate the "unexclusive affirmation
(1) of causality" to our consciousness of Moral Liberty--a
universal affirmation to a special denial---a rule to an
exception....."no right for the interest of the latter
to derogate from the Universality of the former" There-
fore, if both be equally positive, we are not entitled to
sacrifice to the other the alternation which our wishes
prompt us to abandon."

(2)
The very terms of this disclaimer, "interest", "wishes,"
admit the conscious presence of a temptation toward an
intention ethically honorable, perhaps, as an end, however
discreditable such an intention would be logically.

(1) On Reid's Active Powers, Note p. 974.

(2) While Hamilton reprehends at length those who in the in-
terest of a Moral Universe make the judgment of Causality
a positive dictate of intelligence, "yet in order to es-
cape the consequence of the doctrine deny that this dic-
tate though universal in its deliverance should be allow-
ed to hold universally true; and accordingly "exempt from
it the fact of volition"--yet seems perfectly unaware of
the influence upon his own doctrine of his "wishes" and "in-
terest" in the same "Moral Universe",
If guilty of subterfuge, it seems an honest and uncon-
scious one.

But it is unallowed and a compromise is effected.

The same end is reached by a way which, as it seems, "does not at once universally affirm and specially deny, include without exception and yet except". Causality itself furnishes the way, -- for, examined, causality was found to be resolvable into something quite different from "dictate of consciousness," into what is termed mental impotence -- a pure and simple incapacity of thinking the opposite.

It is our limitations only -- and not power, as Kant would imply -- that impose upon us the law of Causality. "Unable positively to think an absolute commencement, our impotence to this drives us backwards on the notion of Cause; unable positively to think an absolute termination, our impotence to this drives us forwards on the notion of Effect". Causality, thus, as a merely "negative judgment" can, it is clear, no longer rival or counterbalance an express affirmation of consciousness such as this of Moral Liberty: by virtue of its self-affirmation alone, Moral Liberty is left in possession of the field.

To the end of this legitimate subordination of one term of the contradiction what Hamilton has done for Causation whether something as illegitimate as he himself considered, by their "sequence", Hume, Dr. Thomas Brown and others

(1) On Reid's Active Powers, Note U. p 974.

(2) Ibid, Note H. p 936.

This sequence as expressed by Hume, reminds one of a passage of Coleridge: "A chain without a staple, from which all the links derived

to do or to seem to do for Necessity,"not to anatomise but truncate--may be safely left for John Stuart Mill to discover, and for some future philosopher, in turn, to discover just what, if any, elements of world-old, true, efficient cause" is to be found in invariable Sequence itself, whether, finally, "any thing may be the cause of anything" or whether "Something must be the cause of something."

However this may be, the issue was now made clear, on the side, at least, of "absolute commencement", and even if we choose to throw out, in toto, on the other that "peculiar" view of causation which as negative withdraws "infinite regress from the category of Equally positive dictates of consciousness", still the issue on that side will remain as clear as before. It cannot be doubted that the question has been cleared once for all of extraneous matter.

their stability or a series without a first, has been not inaptly allegorized as a string of blind men, each holding the skirt of the man before him, reaching far out of sight but all moving without the least deviation in one straight line. It would be naturally taken for granted that there was a guide at the head of the file: what if it were answered, No! Sir, the men are without number, and infinite blindness supplies the place of sight?"

Biographia Literaria, Chap. XII Thesis II Scholium

By this theory of sequence, Hamilton complains "the phenomena to be saved is silently and in effect evacuated of its principle quality--the quality of necessity; where as the real problem is to explain how it is that we cannot but think that all which begins to be has not an absolute but only a relative commencement." Note to Reid's Act. Pow p. 604.

Inseparable association is the solution offered by Mill.

and that Freedom has been clearly outlined as Fact. By reverting to the former positive,,affirmative form of causation we shall only have removed the "preponderance" effected by its perhaps illegitimate subordination and shall be left thereby only more freely to confront the problem in its prior,abstract form of two equated inconceivables which are at the same time equally positive dictates of consciousness. IT is as well perhaps to accept the situation thus in its bareness lest more is assumed than the situation warrants.

If from the nature of the case,⁽¹⁾ one or the other of these alternatives must be true (and not both as Theology declares)and if Metaphysics persistently maintain an oracular silence as seems her function to do,holding in suspense

⁽¹⁾ The Law of Excluded Middle,applicable to Hamilton to all antinomies ,holds,Mill grants,for this antinomy since "the will is wholly a phenomena and has no meaning unless relatively to us",but denies the application of the same law,without reserve,to antinomies involving Time and Space since they are held to have (by Sir William) a noumenal as well as phenomenal existence.

For Theology on this point see:

St. Augustine,Ad Valentinum,Epist.214

St.Bernard,De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. ch.I.

Thomas Aquinas,Summa totius Theologiae,Pars Prima,Questio,XXII Art.4
(quoted by Hamilton Note U.)

Calvin,De Predestination,VolXXp.708 711 725

Ochino,Labyrinthis,ch.I9 p.245. See "Skeptics of the Renaissance"
Vol.Ip.213

Confessions of Faith of the Church of Scotland,ch.III?IX.

Westminster Confession of Faith,ch.V2:ch.III I

Mozley's Augustinian Doctrine,Predestination",ch.X Note XXII.

Descartes and Locke are both quoted by Stewart as holding that both propositions,though irreconcilable,are to be believed.

See also: Ranke,VolIII,308-365?for the action of the Roman Communion on the controversy between the Jesuits and Dominicans under ClementVIII and Paul V 1588.

ed judgment all the perplexities of all the sciences, whence they go forth only to return again as to an ark; if this be, or whatever may be the attitude of Theology and metaphysics, it was not to be expected that the scientific spirit would rest, patient and perplexed, before the two and not elect one or the other, - or electing one not know why.

For, in the first place, it is not the way of science to pronounce any problem, however difficult, insoluble; on the contrary, she assumes all problems soluble and necessarily assumes them so, since in order to the best results, investigation is dependent, no less than Morals and the conduct of life generally, upon an optimistic assumption. "As if" is of quite incalculable power in the domain of practice and is for this reason a universal working hypothesis, without which nothing.

(1) If Metaphysics has spoken definitively on this question, why is it that Psychology, Ethics and other progressive sciences dyslogistically turn the question over to metaphysics for solution?

See Ribot's Diseases of the Will "Introduction"; also Sidgwick's Ethics, p. 68-79.

It would almost seem that when for any science pursuit in a particular direction no longer yields facts, what remains of the question beyond facts reverts by a natural law of entail to the science of sciences.

Whether, then, this particular problem had been declared"
"to the Understanding soluble by none" or not, mattered not
in the least to men of sense and scientific habit, so only
that some fact were given on which to rest a fulcrum of
analysis. Such a fulcrum was now furnished.

In declaring Moral Freedom a fact and consciousness a
witness to it and that as fact it could not be "redargued
on the ground of its incomprehensibility", Sir William Ham
ilton had furnished that for which science waited.

Inasmuch as the fact offered was a peculiar one, a mani
fest exception to the great body of facts known to scienc
it perhaps invited attention, but inasmuch as Moral Freedo
cited as its witness, consciousness, - the first, last, and on
ly resort of science itself and represented it as giving
testimony counter to its own "massive" evidence for causa
tion, - it offered a distinct challenge to investigation
which science was not slow to accept.

Right here it must be admitted that without troubling
itself at all about "infinite regress", infinite non-com
mencement," or an "infinity of relative commencements", -
without troubling itself at all initially to prove causa
tion in the abstract, science had built up for itself

through sensible experience such a "massive" body of eviden

making for causation, as above referred to. - much as perhap
Dissertations on Reid's Active Powers. Note Up. 975.

File. not here.

in an Ideal World, Ethical Experience might be conceived to amass evidence making for righteousness and freedom.

The statement, then, that one fact of the Universe was not only out of line and obedient to no law, but flatly contradicted a known law, and that there was even claimed for it, by virtue of this eccentricity a certain supremacy over the more orderly facts of the Universe led to an exhaustive analysis of all that concerned it.

Although it is one of the confessed anomalies of this controversy that those laying greatest stress upon the "deliverances of consciousness" as to freedom and the Moral Law, have been the last to undertake (and then only in self-defense) any analysis of either volition or consciousness--yet this general arraignment is only partially applicable to Sir William Hamilton: on the contrary, he had sought in the matter of consciousness to fortify his position by certain definitions and distinctions which it may be well to rehearse.

Our extraordinary belief in the Uniformity of Nature, in the congruity of the Future with the Past, Sir James Stephens compares "to a man rowing one way and looking another and steering his boat by keeping his stern in line with an object behind him"

Our notion of causality would thus be of an empirical derivation and without the quality of Universality and Necessity claimed for it Sir William Hamilton. See Dis. on Reid. p. 604.

By Freedom here is meant Rational freedom, not Neutral or Capricious: see "Freedom as found in Kant". Mind, Vol. XIII 1888.

Notes and Dissertations on Reid. p. 713.

In a note to Reid's brief account of "Aristotle's Logic" he writes: "Two things must be distinguished in consciousness--the reality of the phenomena and the truth of what the phenomena vouches. Of the former scepticism is impossible, because the doubt implies a contradiction; of the latter scepticism is always possible because it does not immediately subvert itself." Again and again this distinction is insisted upon as "between the data or deliverance of consciousness considered simply, in themselves, as apprehensions of facts or actual manifestations and those deliverances considered as testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their own phenomenal reality." These data viewed under the former limitation "(of actual manifestation)" are above all suspicion"--far from all possibility of doubt. "For as doubt is itself only a manifestation of consciousness it is impossible to doubt what consciousness manifests without, in thus doubting, doubting that we actually doubt; that is without the doubt contradicting and annihilating itself. Hence it is that the facts of consciousness, as mere phenomena, are, by the unanimous confession of all skept-

1) Reid's Active Powers, Note A, p. 744

2) Ibid. See also Reid, p. 231, 442.

Mill dissents from this "doubt a manifestation of consciousness;" he complains that doubt is here treated as something positive.

See Mill's Ex. of Phil. p. 167

and Idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above all reach of question." Still again, in the same vein: "The one fact--the fact of testimony is an act of consciousness itself: it cannot, therefore, be invalidated without self-contradiction. For to doubt the reality of that of which we are conscious is impossible--for as we can only doubt through consciousness, to doubt of consciousness is to doubt of consciousness by consciousness. If, on the one hand, we affirm the reality of the doubt we thereby explicitly affirm the reality of consciousness and contradict our doubt; if, on the other hand, we deny the reality of consciousness we implicitly deny the reality of our denial itself." Since of such testifying of consciousness "no doubt can be or has been entertained, it is only the authority of these facts as evidence of something beyond themselves that can become matter of discussion. It is not the reality of consciousness that concerns us but its Veracity"

It becomes, then in the light of this analysis, a matter of importance to determine to which class of facts of consciousness any given fact of consciousness belongs, whether to the first, doubt of which is impossible or to the second, doubt of which is more or less possible.

In "facts of consciousness as mere phenomena"--"high above all reach of question" we would seem to have reached a common ground, if for sceptics and Idealists--for Libertarians and Necessitarians, and to have now, as a next step only to inquire to which class of facts of consciousness does this, our fact of Moral Liberty belong, this "immediate datum of an absolute Law of Duty -to say nothing of an immediate datum of Liberty itself."

But questioned as to the immediate datum, Liberty, ambiguous answers issue from the oracle. For each the answer seems as the man: a Protagorean uncertainty prevails.

For one, this "sense of freedom" comes only when thinking of himself hypothetically as having acted otherwise than he did act--and thinking in, therefore, different antecedents: for another it comes in "the moment itself of decision", and is thus a constituent fact of consciousness.

Taking extremes and neglecting intermediate stages it is broadly true that, for the Associationalist, holding one extreme of the doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge, there is no such datum; for those holding the other extreme of the same doctrine, the datum of freedom in willing is the most real fact consciousness has to offer.

To be sure, it has been said of the latter, somewhat "It is left in some uncertainty", says Mill, "Whether consciousness make only one deliverance or two: whether Sir William intends to declare

satirically, by their opponents that they seem not to have heard the voice of consciousness very clearly: an accusation founded, it would seem, upon the non-agreement among themselves, of Intuitionists as to how much and to what consciousness testifies.

But to an ideal spectator, not committed beyond recall to either side internal weakness is disclosed not more by non-agreement of its advocates than by their too great zeal: the weakness of the citadel is often betrayed by efforts to rescue its divinity.

The laudable but too evident intention of Sir William Hamilton to save Freedom; his withdrawal of it from its own ideal realm of Appreciation and attempt to give it place and scientific basis in the world of Description were so many indications of doubt, of partizan-ship and so of weakness.

It was, perhaps, under some such persuasion as this of the internal weakness of the citadel that Mill accepted the challenge in behalf of science and that, as representa

tive of Associationalism he entered the lists on ground of the Determinist's theory of volition to be false or the vulgar notion of Moral Desert to be true. Mill's Ex. of Phil. of the Cond. 283. Ibid. Mr Mansel (Prol. Logica, p. 152) quoted by Mill, p. 283. See also Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. Ed. 4 p. 67 Sect. 3. where "the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action" is cited as the one opposing argument of real force against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism. For examples of this non-agreement-see Ham. Dis. on Reid, p. 749: also

of the opponents' choosing. Could Libertarians be driven off their own subjective field of consciousness that were a victory indeed worth the winning, - could consciousness itself be given over to Experience there certainly would be an end of the matter.

(1) "All theories of the human mind," admitted Mill, "profess to be interpretations of consciousness: the conclusions of all of them are supposed to rest on that ultimate evidence either immediately or remotely. What consciousness directly reveals, together with what can be legitimately inferred from its revelations compose, by universal admission, all that we know of the mind or indeed of any other thing."

Although Mill's analysis of Consciousness as understood by Sir W. Hamilton "was undertaken in the interest, not of this question but of a fundamental problem of knowledge, yet it comes to have some bearing on the question as one sees the circle closing in on consciousness and its so-called "facts" diminishing in number or changing character, one by one, as the psychologist moves on his way toward the subversion of "Primary Truths."

Mill's Ex. of the Phil. of the Cond. p. 282 where striking examples of non-agreement have been focussed.

Ex. of Phil. of Cond. p. 137.

The marks by which Primary Truths - original as distinguished from derivative - may be known, were according to Sir William four in number (1) Incomprehensibility, (2) Simplicity, (3) Necessity, and Universality and (4) Comparative Evidence and Certainty. Dis. on Reid, Note A. 754

By way, not of definition, but of analysis Hamilton had said, "All knowledge is a consciousness and all consciousness is a knowledge"-but had added: "consciousness is a more limited term than knowledge. For knowledge is a knowledge (1) immediate or mediate, (2) actual or potential: whereas consciousness is only immediate and only actual".

Consciousness is thus knowledge, immediate and actual, of things present in time and place. Things past and absent may be known indeed but only mediately through some representative of it in consciousness. For example, "All that is immediately known in the act of memory is the present mental modification; that is, the representation and concomitant belief...so far is memory from being an immediate knowledge of the past, that it is at best only a mediate knowledge of the past; while in philosophical propriety, it is not a knowledge of the past at all, but a knowledge of the present and a belief of the past...We may doubt, we may deny that the representation and belief are true. We may assert that they represent what never was and that all beyond their present mental existence is a delusion", but may not so doubt that of which we have immediate knowledge.

(1)

Quite explicitly elsewhere he states that "Consciousness and immediate knowledge are thus terms universally convertible" and this, in turn, convertible with Intuitive knowledge.- He had moreover defined consciousness as the "recognition by the mind or Ego of its own acts or affections" which would seem to mean that we have the direct evidence of consciousness only for an internal world but in the light of other passages really means, inconsistently enough as Mill has pointed out, that internal world together with all therein implied.

We may pass over with a light step Hamilton's position as regards an external world immediately given, as irrelevant to the matter in hand, but touch it just in passing as offering a parallel to other unanalysed facts of consciousness. If perception and inference from them miss discrimination why may not, in a special case, that between a sensation past as represented and a present sensation-between mediate and immediate knowledge,-in other regard in fact, than that of the external world.

Is our own "immediate datum of Liberty" really immediate? or is it immediate, i.e., in consciousness only in the faint and dubious sense in which a thing past but remembered is in consciousness, half in and half out, if one may use such

a term-out as actual fact, in as representation.-a "composite" datum, as it were, made up of a past and present element? May it not be, says the psychologist, that in the rapid succession of states of consciousness, the sense of freedom attaches itself to some representation of an act in consciousness which representation is not distinguish^{thus}ed from the act itself already past and that it is that the act seems a free act?

Such at least would seem to be the view of some psychologists, as evidenced in personal introspective sketches they have recorded: while others, as Munsterberg and his school hold that the sense of freedom is present at the "rehearsal" of the act which takes place previous to the actual performance and becomes, in this way, confounded with the actual performance.

"I ask my consciousness," says J. S. Mill, "what I do feel and I find that I feel (or am convinced) that I could have chosen the other course if I had preferred it: but not that I could have chosen one course while I preferred the other."

See also;

Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind."

Sully, "Sensation and Illusion." Ch. V.

Ziehen's Elements of Psychology, Closing Ch.

According to Munsterberg, the representation of certain muscular movements arise before the actual movement has had time to supervene, the old copy thus preceeding the new original is taken for the cause of it. Here is his account: "Where the illusion of a conscious activity, set over against the content of consciousness arises there is really nothing for Experience to lay hold of except (1) that a group of sensations of strain take up their position in the field of consciousness and (2) that certain changes in the field make them selves observable."

But here even though they are Philosophers who speak, and the rule¹¹ of Common Sense laid down by its able exponent seems to the letter obeyed, that¹¹ in appealing to the consciousness of mankind in general we only appeal to the consciousness of those not disqualified to pronounce a decision"and that such matters as involve mental analysis cannot, notwithstanding the error which they have so frequently committed, be taken out of the hands of philosophers", -yet what have we but^{dicta} which may be met by counterdicta of other philosophers who will accuse the associationalists of reading into consciousness what is not there, -even as they accuse the Intuitionists of confusing final with original simplicity. What, finally, do the philosophers themselves open up but conflicting subjective data, disclosing a perfect cul de sac so far as facts are concerned and thus no field for science.

So much for one datum, that of Liberty: it remains to consider "the immediate datum of the Moral Law."

In meeting Hamilton on the matter of Freedom, Mill granted for sake of the argument he would not divert, "infinite regress" and "absolute commencement" to be in themselves and equally "inconceivable", approved in the main, the distinction between the two classes of facts of consciousness

and finally admitted that consciousness is supposed to be and indeed is the best evidence possible--or at least "would be if we were always sure what is consciousness".

21 July 1940 "Consciousness" he comments, in the sense usually attached to it by Philosophers, - consciousness of the mind's own feeling and operations, - cannot, as our author truly says, be disbelieved. The inward fact, the feeling of our own minds, was never doubted, since to do so would be to doubt that we feel what we do feel. What our author calls the testimony of consciousness to something beyond itself, may be, and is, denied; but what is denied has almost always been that consciousness gives the testimony; not that, if given it must be believed."

And again,[†] "At first sight it might seem as if there could not possibly be any doubt whether our consciousness does or does not affirm any given thing. Nor can there, if consciousness, as it usually does, ^{means} means self-consciousness. If consciousness tells me that I have a certain thought or sensation, I assuredly have that thought or sensation. But if consciousness means a power which can tell me things that are not phenomena of my own mind, there is immediately the broadest divergence of opinion as to what are the things which consciousness testifies.

This inconceivability is elsewhere contested and explained from the point of view of Experience as due to Inseparable Association (OVER)

There is nothing which people do not think and say that they know by consciousness,-provided they do not remember any time when they did not know or believe it, and are not aware in what manner they came by the belief. For consciousness in this extended sense, is but another word for Intuitive knowledge: and whatever other things we may know in that manner, we certainly do not know by intuition what knowledge is intuitive. It is a subject on which both the vulgar and the ablest thinkers are constantly making mistakes."

We see plainly enough that it is not sufficient "to say that something is testified by consciousness and refer all dissentients to consciousness to prove it." For "substitute for consciousness the equivalent phrase Intuitive knowledge and it is seen that this is not a thing which can be proved by mere introspection of ourselves. Introspection can show us a present belief or conviction, attended with a greater or less difficulty in accommodating the thoughts to a different view of the subject: but that this belief or conviction or knowledge, if we call it so, is intuitive, no introspection can ever show: unless we are at liberty to assume that every mental process which is now as unhesitating and as rapid as intuition, was intuiti

(1) tive at the outset."

And still again, what is even more to the point, "we have⁽²⁾ it not in our power to ascertain by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, when those original revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions."

What, then, is intuitive from the outset, what original and what acquired is the first problem of Science as regards consciousness and Locke was, perhaps, the first to recognize it as such. His "origin of Ideas" had struck the keynote of a new method, which as scientific, aimed to fortify subjective by objective observation. - to add to the certainty of the former, the exactness of the latter.

The difficulty of the problem was great, so great as to lead Kant to declare that Psychology could never become a science of observation and experiment, for the reason he said that "the elements of inner observation cannot be readily isolated and recombined at will after the manner of physical or chemical observation." Yet great as was this difficulty and fully realized, had for the psychology no deterrent force, but if anything an excitent.

For Primary Truths as understood by Sir W. Hamilton, see Ex. of his Phil. p. 93, 187 "The test by which they" (including Kant and Spencer

U "We have", reiterates Mill, "no means of of interrogating consciousness in the only circumstances in which it is possible for it to give a trustworthy answer. Could we try the experiment of the first consciousness in any infant--its first reception of the impressions which we call external; whatever was present in that first consciousness would be as much entitled to credit--, indeed there would be as little possibility of discrediting it--as our sensations themselves"..... "That a belief or knowledge of such objects is in our consciousness now, whenever we use our eyes or our muscles, is no reason for concluding that it was there from the beginning, unless we have settled the question whether it could possibly have been brought in since. If any mode can be pointed out in which within the compass of possibility it might have been brought in, the hypothesis must be examined and disproved before we are entitled to conclude that the conviction is an original deliverance of consciousness"..... "Being unable to examine the actual contents of our consciousness until our earliest, which are necessarily our most firmly knit associa-

"all decide a belief to be a part of our primitive consciousness, - an original intuition of the mind - is the necessity of thinking it. Their proof that we must always from the beginning, have had a belief is the impossibility of getting rid of it now." (p/187.)

/ Ibid. p. 182.

This antithesis is fully worked out by George Lewes in "Problems of Life and mind" ch. V.

The Critical Phil. of Kant. Caird's Ed. Vol. I. p. 167.

Ex. of the Phil. of Sir W. Hamilton p. 107.

tions, those which are most intimately interwoven into the original data of consciousness, -are fully formed, we cannot study the original elements of mind in the facts of our present consciousness. Those original elements can only come to light as residual phenomena by a previous study of the modes of generation of the mental facts which are confessedly not original; a study sufficiently thorough to enable us to apply its results to the convictions, beliefs or supposed intuitions which seem to be original, and to determine whether some of them may not have been generated in the same modes, so early as to have become inseparable from our consciousness before the time at which memory commences."

This long extract must be its own apology: it is important as furnishing succinctly in outline the Psychological method of procedure (as opposed to the introspective) in regard to consciousness and its immediate data.

As "genesis" has thrown a flood of light on matters physical so, it is thought, the genesis of mental facts will unlock the secret springs of thought and Moral life. As "original data", falsely so-called, are traced to their small, faint beginnings in sensations, associated more or less

separably--How is it, it may be asked, with our immediate datum of an absolute Law of Duty-. Is it, then, not "peculiar" but explicable quite by its faraway genesis in inseparably associated sensations? *Is it, too, analyzable into simple and determined sensations & elements?*

However this may result, it is clear that the question is no longer, to which "class of facts of consciousness" does this "fact of Moral Liberty" (Moral Law) belong- and therefore may we or may we not doubt its dictum--but is it a fact at all of consciousness?

In his "examination of the Philosophy of the Conditioned" Mill has given as one of several reasons for taking the writings of Sir W. Hamilton as his text-books on that subject and for dealing with its opinions as expressed by him--that he was at once "the ablest, the most clearsighted, and the most candid" of that school: with like point the same reason may be given for citing Mill himself as offering in this Examination, the clearest possible exposition of the opposite method of metaphysical inquiry.

While accrediting Sir William with such analysis of consciousness as he had made, Mill contends that he has not only not gone far enough in this analysis but, what is far worse, failed to take sufficient, if any, cognizance of the great principle arraigned against him. Not once or twice

but many times in the course of this Examination the Intuitive school itself and in the person of its representative is taken to task for its "invincible ignorance" of the main instrument employed against it--an instrument, moreover, which claimed "to unlock the deeper mysteries of mental science"--and "has been employed in this country and age by thinkers of the highest order as the most potent of all instruments of psychological analysis."

Such were the claims and such the recognition by psychologists of the Law of Inseparable Association: claims it would seem sufficient to ensure its serious consideration by opposing ranks, especially when re-enforced by the declaration that it is the "very basis of that theory which they have to encounter at every point and which it is necessary for them to refute first as the condition of establishing their own."

This was, in fact, as it proved the little cloud no larger than a man's hand-but big with fate- in the clear sky of Intuitional First Principles which escaped the no-

tice of that unprophetic body. "Not so much rejected as ignored by them" complains Mill, yet in this same passage he characterizes this fundamental law to be "the least familiar and most imperfectly understood of all the laws of association." A basis of this kind, it may be, has some
at page } difficulties.

This principle originating with Hartley, had been recalled to the attention of philosophers by Mr. James Mill in his Analysis of the Human Mind and as explicated by him is briefly this:

Δ ——— "When two or more ideas have been often repeated together and the association has become very strong, they sometimes spring up in such close combination as not to be distinguishable. some cases of sensation are analogous.

Next page. For example, when a wheel on the seven parts of which the seven prismatic colors are respectively painted, is made to revolve rapidly, it appears not of seven colors but of one uniform color -white. By the rapidity of the succession the several sensations cease to be distinguishable; they run, as it were, together, and a new sensation, compounded of all the seven, but apparently a single one, is the result.

Ideas, also which have been so often conjoined that when ever one exists in the mind, the others immediately exist along with it, seem to run into one another, to coalesce,

(1) as it were, and out of many to form one idea; which idea, however, in reality complex, appears to be no less simple than any one of those of which it is compounded."

....."Some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined that they cannot be separated. If one exists, the other exists along with it, in spite of whatever effort we may make to disjoin them. For example; it is not in our power to think of color, without thinking of extension; or of solidity, without figure. We have never seen it except in this connection. Color and extension have been invariably conjoined. The idea of color therefore uniformly comes into the mind bringing that of extension along with it; and so close is the association, that it is not in our power to dissolve it. We cannot, if we will, think of color but in combination with extension. The one idea calls up the other and retains it, so long as the other is retained."

One such difficulty, pointed out by Dr. Martineau, is found in the fact that psychologists are not agreed upon their catalogue of elements or the marks by which they may know the simple from the compound" in other words--the psychologic unit is not fixed/"

See Essays, Phil. and Theol. First Series. p. 268-27

Δ Analysis of the Human Mind. 68-75.

This "as it were" James terms "delightfully characteristic of the school." Vol. I 356.

In the hands of its propagators, this Law of Inseparable Association becomes the powerful instrument it was, by James Mill prophesied to become. It is used to explain not only belief in an External World and the Necessary truths of mathematics but the hitherto sacred and peculiar fact of Conscience --feeling of Moral Responsibility or Accountability.

What is Moral Responsibility? asks the psychologist and himself answers: It is the fusion of two simple ideas, Wrong-doing and Punishment. The modification of these two simple ideas has produced a third, the elements of which are no longer distinct --that of Moral Responsibility.

The "Law of Contiguity" -strength of association increased beyond any assignable limit -together with the "Law of Obliviscence", by virtue of which elements not attended to tend to drop out, explain the "product" fully.

For note: "From our earliest childhood the ideas of doing wrong and of punishment are presented to the mind together and the intense character of the impression causes the association between them to attain to the highest de

See Mill's Logic, p. 172 seq.
Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 295.

gree of closeness and intimacy" (contiguity)..Is it strange or unlike the usual processes of the human mind that in these circumstances we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on which it is grounded?" (oblivisence).."but why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason has never in our early education,been presented to the mind.The only ideas presented have been those of Wrong and Punishment and an inseparable association has been created between these directly,without the help of any intervening idea".

But how in the product distinguish the elements? one [†] may ask:-What would you?It is a possible synthesis and th Law of Parsimony compels us to accept it".

Responsibility means punishment,) implies liability to punishment. This feeling of liability may be of two kinds ; one is an actual expectation,if we act in a certain way, of punishment being inflicted upon us by our equal,or by Supreme Power.-the other is the consciousness that we "ought" to be so punished.

[†] Ibid p.293.

How fundamental is the idea of punishment in that of the compound, Responsibility,is fully developed in a Note on Moral Sense" in J. S Mill's Edition of the Analysis of the Human mind in which he claims Duty or Obligation to contain the same elements with Utility or Benevolence with the exception that the idea of Duty contains an additional idea-that of punishment.

The first, plainly the result of experience and instruction, cannot be either an immediate datum or a freedom-implying fact of consciousness. This "ought", it may be, is the remnant now left to Moral Liberty, -for we are told it is not the belief that we shall be made accountable that can be deemed to require the free-will hypothesis: it is the belief that we "ought to be, that we justly are accountable, that guilt deserves punishment!"

The real issue then is according to Mill, the justness of punishment and whether in the justness of punishment, free-will is involved. And first, would punishment be just supposing the wrong-doer could not help doing the wrong thing? Certainly, replies Mill, -"if the expectation of punishment enables him to help it". Punishment as supplying an additional motive to right doing is just, -but punishment in this sense proceeds on the assumption that the will is governed by motives. Insofar as the will is "free and capable of acting against motives, punishment is disappointed of its object and deprived of its justification".

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Two ends, and two ends only justify punishment; benefit of the offender and the protection of others:-for these ends it is just to punish-"freewill or no freewill"--Freewill has nothing to do with the matter as the following extract will show.

"Now the primitive consciousness we are said to have that we are accountable for our actions, and if we violate the rule of right we shall deserve punishment, I contend in nothing else than knowledge that punishment will be just; that by such conduct we shall place ourselves in the position in which our fellow creatures, or the Deity, or both will naturally and may justly, inflict punishment upon us.

By using the word justly I am not assuming, in the explanation; the thing I profess to explain. * * *
I am entitled to postulate the reality; and the knowledge and feeling ^{of} moral distinctions. These it is both evident metaphysically and notorious historically, are independent of any theory concerning the will. We are supposed capable of understanding that other people have rights and all that follows from this.


Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil., p. 292, 3.

This justifies Sidgwick's declaration that if the Will is not free, the meaning of Justice must be changed.

es

The mind which possesses this idea, if capable of placing itself at the point of view of another person, must recognise it as just that others should protect themselves against any disposition on his part to infringe their rights, and his rights continually require the same protection. This, I maintain is our feeling of accountability, in so far it can be separated from the prospect of being actually called to account. No one who understands the power of the principle of association, can doubt its sufficiency to create out of these elements the whole of the feeling of which we are conscious. To rebut this view of the case would require positive evidence; as, for example, if it could be proved that the feeling of accountability precedes, in the order of development, all experience of punishment. No such evidence has been produced it is producible."

This has the flourish of finality and one wedded to the "idols of the tribe" may well look askance at the genesis of idols no more grateful for the pure hellebore of analysis that brings disillusion, than the man



(1)

of Argos who, brought to himself, exclaimed "Pol me
occidistis, amici, Non servastis, cui sic extorta
voluptas, Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error!"

Has , then, our Imperative of Morality become there-
by a Mendacious Imperative, or, as mere reaction from
punishment, no longer authoratative, no longer moral."
Is this all of "Ought" and so of Freedom?

It may be questioned whether the genesis of con-
sciousness and of moral consciousness in particular
has not its own difficulties to meet and does not of-
fer, despite its confident tone, as large a field for
difference of opinion as the notoriously unanalysed
consciousness of the Intuitionists. If non- a-
greement among advocates be held a valid objection to
one, it would seem that it may be held of some force
against the scientific character of the other or at
least furnish a Roland for an Oliver and work for
"those who know."

the

With all the help of revolving disk as illustrative
of fusion of sensations, the fusion of the ideas of

Horace, Epis. II, 1 128-142. The application of these lines is limit-
ed to the gratitude: other elements of the story might imply some
prejudgment of the question of free-will. Such decisive at-
titude is irrelevant to the present discussion and is disclaimed on
this as well as on other more genuine grounds.

Examples of such divergence of views may be found in a recent vol. of Mind

"Associationalism" - by A. Bain.

wrong doing and punishment remains somewhat mythical as an equivalent for the "ought" of our prejudice.

When the statement is made that "No one who understands the power of the principle of association can doubt its sufficiency to create out of these elements the whole of the feeling of which we are conscious." One may forbear to note the metaphor and to ask what occult power is exercised by this principle--but can hardly fail to feel the absence in the compound of that ideal element which has given to Duty its unique character in the general consciousness and to protest against the phrase "whole of the feeling of which we are conscious." . . . Whole of that feeling it is not for those infected with Kantian precepts, unless wrong-doing be itself a compound and something more than that for which we are punished or are to expect punishment. Of course postulating "the reality and the knowledge and the feeling of moral distinctions" may be postulating a germ of conscience and thus all that the most exacting could demand in behalf of the

moral consciousness; this is possible ^{for} what knowledge it is, that is postulated in the argument is not stated, whether an original a priori knowledge--as "primitive" consciousness would seem to imply or derived as "notorious historically" would seem to imply. In the absence of proof it is permitted to doubt.

The destructive work begun with the question What is consciousness? What, its primary truths? reached constructive consummation in Consciousness is experience; its primary truths, products of experience: its Law of Duty not peculiar, not supreme, is one of many products: its genesis is that of other products sensations inseparably associated.

Reduction of the Moral Law to sensation elements -- wholly successful or not--may be said to crown the efforts of scientific moral consciousness, Psychology, and, in a way, to close the encounter between new and old methods. The new has scored some triumphs it must be confessed since it effects that if the phoenix of Moral Law arise again from its ashes it must be because it has

re-conquered experience by its inherent Beauty--and reinstated its products, as primary in a new sense, and necessary, not because "they cannot be got rid of now but because Experience has set its seal of priceless value upon them.

In full view of this demolition of the traditional Moral Responsibility and vulgar notion of Desert, it is a fact full of comfort to some that "Hard" Determinism in the person of Mill himself makes certain concessions, here and there, which put him in line, willy nilly, with the philosopher of Koenigsberg and with "Soft" Determinists generally.

In his autobiography, quoted by Carpenter (Preface to Mental Physiology,) he writes, "I saw that though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances; and that what is really inspiring and ennobling in the doctrine of freewill is the conviction that we have real power over the formation of our character, that our will by influencing some of our circumstances can modify our future habits and capacities of willing": while in his Logic of Moral Science there are several such admissions--

Hard" and "Soft" terms used by James to designate the right and left wings of Determinism: Dilemma of determinism. Uni. Rev. 1884. Mill accuses Kant of "changing the venue of Freewill, from our actions

one will serve: "Indeed if we examine closely we shall find that this feeling of our being able to modify our character, if we wish is itself the feeling of Moral Freedom of which we are conscious.

A person is morally free who feels that his habits or his temptations are not his master but he theirs: who even in yielding to them know that he could resist: that were he desirous of altogether throwing them off there would not be required for the purpose a stronger desire than he knows himself to be capable of feeling.

What, we may ask, is meant by our own desires in the sentence quoted by Dr. Carpenter? Does Mill here recognise, as Dr. Carpenter thinks he does, a factor in the formation of character which is something else than heredity plus such environment or must we suppose a man of penetration as J Stuart Mill not to have seen that if man's desires are themselves the result of antecedent circumstances "the incubus of hopeless slavery to those circumstances of which he complains in his autobiography," can no more be removed by any desires for self-improvement which ex hypothesi arise out of them than a weight which bears down on a

generally to the formation of character": to form character being the function of freedom as understood by Kant.

man's shoulder can be lifted by its own pressure"?

Sincere acceptance of the doctrine offered Mill in his father's now classic Analysis of the Human Mind might easily result in this sense of "incubus of hopeless slavery, the to antecedent circumstances" and words quoted from his autobiography be as easily the but half-smothered protest of the natural man against such bondage, - against being thrust stage merely upon which trains of association come and go, upon which he can put, so to speak, no break, can neither arrest nor further.

Protest of an unreasoning kind might end here in protest but in the present case we are bound to go further, to assume a reason and to find it if possible.

The treatment of Desire by the older and by the younger Mill offer certain marked differences, that of the former appearing clearly in his Analysis of the Will. This Analysis interesting in itself as bringing order out of chaos, is important as furnishing much of the stuff of which the New Psychology is made and is besides much to the present purpose, since by a kind of anticipation it

This figure is not meant to caricature Association: but is the result of an attempt, in deference to that school, to avoid anything savoring of animism or metaphor; recent reading has unearthed, to the satisfaction of the writer, a parallel in Hume's Human Nature which runs: thus: "The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of positions and situations."

See Autobiography, p. 169.

touches or ignores in either case with firm deterministic hand two or three classes of phenomena adduced by later psychologists in support of a free element in the great drama of association and for this reason affords a valuable starting point from which to study divergent views.

Desire takes its place, we shall find, in this treatise as an idea and, as an idea, falls in line with other ideas in a train of association:--but this is to anticipate. Prefacing that the object of the Inquiry is to find out what that peculiar state of mind or consciousness is by which action is preceded James Mill divides "all actions of a human being into two sorts: those which are called actions of his body; those which are called actions of his mind." Since the actions of the body are all of one sort--fibrous contraction, the first question is what are the states of mind which precede a fibrous contraction.

Having established by an ample induction of facts of Physiology and Pathology that muscular contraction "follows as an effect its cause (1) sensation (2) Ideas ; and that in a vast proportion of those cases the sequence is in-

variable, he shows that his conclusion is not at variance with common belief on the subject. That actions follow ideas, for example, he finds to be "not inconsistent with the language of advocates of Free-will." They hold in fact the idea as opposed to sensation to be ^{the} antecedent of action of the muscles and that "our power of willing consists in the power of calling into existence the appropriate idea: and that the power of the will is not immediately over the muscle, but over the idea"

In support of this statement of the free-will position from the point of view of Psychology Dr. Reid is quoted, and is credited with the distinction on this basis of actions, voluntary from action, involuntary; "Involuntary action follows sensation," says Reid, "voluntary action, Ideas."

But from the examples adduced by Dr. Reid in support of part first of this distinction--notably that of the sucking child who in his first performance of that act cannot be said to will to suck, but to be moved to the act by sensation--it also appears fully, says Mill "that the action willed which he (Reid) considers the foundation of volition must in all cases be subsequent to the performance of the

act by sensation; in other, that the idea cannot exist but in consequence of the sensation." What ever then ,he concludes, causes the idea causes the action ;and since motion of the muscles is in all cases the immediate effect either of sensation or of idea, and since involuntary motion may be proved to be preceded immediately by either sensation or idea ;voluntary by idea only ,it follows that the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary action is not the having or not having the antecedent idea but the having this idea under certain different conditions, as accompanied or not accompanied by certain states of consciousness.

In what manner then, it may be asked, is the idea called up in cases called involuntary? In what manner in those called voluntary? The accompanying state of consciousness in the latter case is found to be a state of pleasure or Desire. In his own words "There appear no circumstances by which the cases called voluntary are distinguished from the involuntary except that in the voluntary there exists a desire" A desire is elsewhere defined as an idea of pleasure having a future reference and is distinguished from pleasure thus: "My state of consciousness under the sensation I call a pleasure; my state of consciousness under the idea, that is, the idea itself I call a Desire."

And again: "The terms, idea of pleasure and desire are but two names; the thing named, the state of consciousness is one and the same." Since Desire and Idea of Pleasure are convertible terms it follows naturally enough that "the number of our desires is the same with that of our pleasurable sensations; the number of our aversions the same with the number of our painful sensations."

The future element of the first given definition of desire seems to have dropped out in the latter idea of pleasure, simply, or to have fallen into the background possibly because of its relative lack of importance in comparison with that of establishing Desire as an idea among other ideas. Strong writing seems at times to require such omissions but in the present case the lost element must be reinstated as an essential part of Mr. James Mill's conception of Desire and read in where the genius of strong writing has suppressed it.

But neither idea of pleasure nor idea of pleasure as future fills out for John Stuart Mill the content of Desire

His first objection to these definitions--logical and destructive-- is to the effect that they are incongruous

with other expressions in the Analysis and positively conflict with a peculiar state of consciousness there assumed called "a state of unsatisfied desire." In what sense is it possible, he asks, to speak of an unsatisfied idea? and concludes that although one might rationally speak of an unsatisfied expectation, that would only mean "an expectation not fulfilled, in other words an expectation of pleasure not followed by the pleasure, an expectation followed by a mere negation." How such an idea of pleasure followed not by a pain but by nothing at all is converted into a pain, the pain of unsatisfied desire is, he protests, a fact not explained by the author's theory, since no associations have been pointed out which account for it and "stands as evidence that there is in Desire something inherently distinct from an idea or an expectation."

His second point, slightly constructive, is truthfully vague as to whether desire arises ab extra or ab intra or just where in the determined circle of our mental life ideas or desires become our own. ^{in any sense} The "something in herently distinct from an idea or an expectation," one is left, in short, to find for himself in a new definition of Desire as "in truth the initiatory stage of will!"

"In what we call Desire there is, I think, always included a positive stimulation to action; either to the definite course of action which would lead to our obtaining the pleasure, or to a general restlessness and vague seeking after it: even when it prompts to a definite act it may be repressed by a stronger motive, or by the knowledge that the pleasure is not within present reach, nor can be brought nearer to us by any present action of our own. Still, there is, I think, always the sense of a tendency to action in the direction of pursuit of the pleasure, though the tendency may be overpowered by an external or internal restraint."

"Initiatory stage of will", unsatisfactory as is the analysis here given, betrays the region of Motive and recalls by law of contrast the firm, if hard, lines of the Analysis in which there are no "ifs" or "buts" or if they occur, they are apodictic and ring in a way to bring confusion to the enemy.

The ground of contention, it is to be observed, is now removed from consciousness of a Moral Law to Phenomena of Will and Freedom is to be proved or disproved according

or is not
ing as direct evidence is found for it in this indefinite
field. Indefiniteness cannot, however, be applied to the
Analysis.

definitively
In a voluntary action we are taught by the author of
that treatise to recognize two ideas: first the idea of
the sensation, of the ^{or exemption} pleasure; secondly the idea of an ac-
tion of our own as the cause of the pleasure, and taught
also to see how easy it is that the idea of a pleasure
should excite the Idea of the action which is the cause
of it and how when the Idea exists the action should fol-
low.

But "the Idea of a pleasure as effect, associated with
with the Idea of an act of our own, as its cause, is one of
the cases of motive.....it seems also to be one of the
cases of will. It may then be asked if the will is or
is not, anything different from the motive?" This ques-
tion is followed by so fine an example of the working of
trains of association back and forth as to doubly justify
a somewhat full quotation. The "course pursued by the
mind in devising and executing a train of means for the
accomplishment of an end" is thus described: "The End;
that is, the advantage or pleasure desired, is the first
thing in the contemplation of the mind: the step nearest

to the end in the process of attainment, is the second; the step immediately preceding that is the third; and so on, to the step at which the process of execution must begin.... such is the order in which the mind proceeds from the primary conception of the end through the requisite series of means. The order of execution is directly the reverse. It begins where the other ends, and ends where the other begins. . . . There is this double operation in what we may call the formation and execution of motives. The first association starts from the pleasure. The idea of the pleasure is associated with its immediate cause, that cause with its cause and so on, till it reaches that act at of ours which is the opposite end of the train. The process may stop here, and in that case the motive does not excite to action. If it excites to action the process is exactly reversed. In the first process of association the pleasure was the first link in the chain, the action, the last: in the second process, the action is the first; the pleasure the last. When the first process only is performed, the association is called motive; when the second is performed, it is called will.

Compare Hugo 'Munsterberg's analysis of the will.

"A difficulty, however, presents itself. The first process terminates in an idea of the action. The second process commences with an idea of the action. The idea of the action is thus excited twice. But the first time it is not followed by the action; the second time it is. How is this to be reconciled with the supposed constancy of connection between the muscular action and the idea which produces it? The difficulty is solved by observing that the phrase, 'Idea of the action' has two meanings. There are two Ideas, one is the outward appearance of the action and is always a very obvious idea. The other is the copy of those internal sensations which originally called the muscles into action, to which from habit of not attending to them, we have lost the power of attending. This last is by no means an obvious idea. And the mind passes over it so quickly, intent upon the action which is its result, that it is almost always swallowed up in the mass of association. It constitutes, in fact, one of the most remarkable instances of that class of links in a chain, which how important soever to the existence of the chain are passed over so quickly that the existence of them is hardly ever recognized."

It is this last least obvious idea of action , "the existence of which is hardly ever recognized" that is ,we are told, the idea upon which the contraction of the muscle is consequent and thus ,if recognized, the last thing in consciousness in the action process of association; while in the process of association called Motive, the obvious idea of action, that of its outward appearance is the idea excited and thus the last thing in consciousness.

If the association stops at the obvious idea of action the motive is inoperative; but if it does not stop there but goes on to the obscure idea of the internal feeling of the action , -the motive becomes operative and we are said to will.

So much of this process having been divulged one is a little surprised at the confession that "if we are asked how an idea as that of the outward appearance of an act should at one time excite an idea as that of the internal feelings of the act, at another time, not excite it, we can only refer to the laws of association as far as they have been ascertained. We know there are certain cases of association so strong that the one idea never exists without calling up the other. We know that there other cases in which an idea sometimes does and sometimes does not call

up such or such an idea."

This unexplained "sometimes does and sometimes does not" is the first break in the chain of association admitted by Mr. Mill and is in fact, the only recognition he vouchsafes phenomenon as old in recognition as Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and which as an accident if not an essential has become inseparably associated with the subject of the will. Inoperative motives would seem to open the door to the Deliberative situation; but if so, is avoided, possibly as a precincts of the "psychologic Ghost."

However that may be, asinus Johannis Buridani is left undisturbed and the Analysis of the Will resumed.

The example set, however, we need not follow but consider for a moment the deliberative situation.

One has only to put the above analysis of the will as conceived by James Mill into close juxtaposition with that of Aristotle contained in Book III of *Nicomachean Ethics* to decide which of the two the more nearly represents the will phenomena of our experience.

"About things eternally fixed", says Aristotle, "no one deliberates; nor again about things that change but which

always happen in the same way either necessarily, or naturally, or from some other cause; nor about those which are variable, as drought^{and} rains; nor fortuitous matters, as finding of treasure.....But we do deliberate respecting such practical matters as are in our ^{new} power.... And as man in general deliberates about what man in general can effect, so individuals do about such practical things as can be effected through there own instrumentality.....Deliberation takes place in such matters as are under general laws, but uncertain how in any given case they will issue and in which in some indefinteness.Further men deliberate not about Ends but Means to Ends.....having set before them a certain end they look how and through what means it may be accomplished. If there is a choice of means of accomplishing they examine further which are the easiest and most creditable or if there is but one means of accomplishing the object, then how may it be through this, this again through what

till they come to the first cause. But this will be the last found; for a man engaged in a process of deliberation seems to seek and analyse, as a man, to solve a geometrical problem, analyzes the figure given him.....
tion
Plainly not every search is Deliberate, but deliberation is a search and the last steps in the analysis is the first in the constructive process.

man
"So it seems, as has been said, that is the originator of his actions; and Deliberation has for its object whatever may be done through one's own instrumentality, and the actions are with a view to other things and so it is not the End but the Means to Ends, on which Deliberation is employed. . . .

"Further exactly the same matter is the object both of Deliberation and Moral Choice; but that which is the object of Moral Choice is thence forward separated and definite, because by object of Moral Choice is denoted that which after Deliberation has been preferred to something else: for each man leaves off searching how he shall do a thing when he has brought the origination up

to himself because it is this which makes the Choice.

Now since the object of Moral Choice is something which is in our own power and which is an object of deliberation and the grasping of the Will, Moral Choice must be a grasping after something in our ^{own} power consequent upon Deliberation."

Occasional agreements between the two analyses may be noted; "the last step in the analysis is the first step in the constructive process" of Aristotle has its parallel in Mill's "course pursued by the mind in devising and executing a train of means for the accomplishing of an end" in which the last step in the analysis of motive is the first in the constructive process of action or volition: the conclusion however in the two cases is vastly different.

Mr. Mill does not conclude with Aristotle that "Man is the originator of his own actions" and only "leaves off searching when he has brought the origination up to himself because it is this which makes the choice", possibly because for Mr. Mill there was no origination and no himself to which to bring the train.

In our own power" and in the trains' power, are conceptions as widely apart as the poles.

From Aristotle's time to the present the phenomena of Inoperative motives, known in Psychology as Deliberation,

in Physiology as Inhibition have been thought to offer evidence of a real, if limited power of the Ego over its own activities. Any, however limited power of this kind has been, as we shall find, strenuously ignored by Mr. Mill or explained away by a system of high lights and deep shadows. When in tracing the progress of the train from a distant idea of pleasure on, step by step, to the obvious idea of the act, he stated that "how an idea, as that of the outward appearance, of the act should at one time excite an idea as that of the internal feeling of the act and at another, not excite it" can only be referred to the laws of association so far as they have been ascertained" he no doubt believed that association, more or less separable, would eventually disclose the secret of inoperative motives, - and perhaps it may.

Meanwhile Physiology busying itself about Inhibition has offered an explanation of its own based on experiment and would say that "Motor actions and actions of Inhibition have their seat in the same elements" and that "every time a nerve is excited there are produced two kinds of modification in opposite directions".

But whether or not a nerve be traversed at the same time by a wave of inhibition and by a wave of excitation does not much concern consciousness since consciousness knows nothing directly of nerves or nerve waves ,of anodes or cathodes.

"Consciousness" says Ribot, "knows only two things: the fact of departure and the fact of arrival: the I will and the act produced or inhibited. All intermediate states escape it."

A congeries then of inoperative motives may be supposed to constitute for consciousness the deliberative state; deliberation, itself to be an interruption of the usual course of things, - a break in the causal series from stimulus to act - the advent, if of a new link merely, of a link that behaves differently from the rest of the series in being to a degree capricious.

The recognition of this break or difference of action leads logically to the denial of Causality in the strict sense of that word as Efficient , to the new link of motive or desire: for causation in that strict sense implies the immediate production of the effect whenever the proper condition are present. If then motives as antecedents are in this sense causes of volition, volition, the effect, must take place directly upon the presence in conscious-

ness of the motive or desire. That this is not invariably the case is established by the fact of Deliberation.

If the distinction made by the author of the Analysis be accepted and the presence of desire be held to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action and the order of events be assumed to be stimulus/sensation/desire/volition the alternatives are open: desire in this connection may be considered the necessary effect of its antecedent, sensation, and the necessary cause of what follows or accompanies it, volition, in which case the series is strictly causal and allows of no interruption; or, on the other hand it may be considered a form of motive, -an "idea of ends" and thus become a final cause before it becomes efficient and, by virtue of its brief release from the chain of efficient causes, is held to be in so far "free" and the volition resulting from such motive, a free volition.

It will be noticed that "free" actions are no longer motive-less but motived and involve responsibility because they are free actions--not free because they involve responsibility. I am free because I am responsible for my acts is no longer the formula. If the connection is to be retained the clauses must change places.

In fact Hobbes' definition of Liberty as "the absence of all impediment to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent" has been accepted by Determinists and Indeterminists alike and so far there is mediation. "That seems to be compulsory" says quaint old Aristotle, "whose origination is from without, the compellee contributing nothing", and on this ancient and sound basis attempts are made to discriminate between actions due to external influences and those having an Internal or Ideational source. The latter are held to be "free", the former, determined.

This is equivalent, it may be said, to dividing motive forces into efficient causes and final causes of conduct: but they are not reciprocally exclusive of each other as has been pointed out by Dr. Hyslop of Columbia in his recent article on Inhibition. There are motives to actions, to be sure, which are only efficient causes--as reflex and instinctive actions--but others there are which are both efficient and final. The former class produce acts immediately and necessarily; the latter may produce acts immediately but not necessarily and herein lies the difference.

As "ideas of ends" the latter are final causes which may become efficient causes and exhibit the same immediacy as the former.

. "The presence of the final cause^H according to Dr. Hyslop, is what makes them free and the presence of efficiency in that cause at the same time brings the volition under the general law of causation but with the limitation due to the fact that the motive is a final cause also, - that the causality is subjective and internal and not objective or external."

While the latter kind of causality excludes deliberation; the former admits it and admitting deliberation "insures the existence of actions quite distinct and independent of the law of mechanical causation": for the causal connection between sensation and volition being once broken by inhibition, the motive to action must come from the Ideational centres which thus "assume an impulsive efficiency of their own".

But this motive not only comes from the ideational centres but is above and beyond all cavil their motive "not contributed" says, Dr. Hyslop, "by the external impression or the sensation although they are instrumental in its occurrence, but an original and creative product of the ideational centres so far as form and matter are concerned."

It is moreover efficient precisely as any motive may be supposed to be, except that this efficient power does not

appear until it first occurs as a final cause.

The source, then, of the motive in a given case determines whether the act is free or not. If internal, the origination may be said to be brought up to the Ideational centres, that is, to the "himself" of Aristotle, and when that is accomplished one may leave off searching since the activity of the Self is established and with it the reality of Moral Choice .

With this stasimon of the Subject and Moral Choice the first episode in the drama of Association closes and that of Attention begins.

"We may still," continues Mr. Mill in his Analysis, "be reasonably called upon to explain the power which the mind appears to possess over its associations. There is a distinction in the trains of the mind which is observed by everybody. Some trains as those in dreams, in delirium in frenzy are supposed to proceed according to the established law of association without any direction from the mind. Other trains: a piece of reasoning for example, any process of thought, directed to an end; are considered as wholly under the guidance of the mind. The guidance of the mind is but another name for the Will. And thus it is inferred that the Will is not association but some thing which controls association."

The will ,if supposed to control association,can control it in only one of two ways: either by calling up the idea independently of association or by making an idea call up not the idea which would follow it spontaneously but some otheridea."

The first supposition,he declared,relinquished by the consent of philosophers: since "we cannot will without willing something; and in willing we must have an idea of the thing willed. If we will an idea ,therefore,we must have the idea. The idea does not remain to be called up.

It is called up already. To say that we will to have an idea when we already ^{have} it is a mere absurdity."

The second supposition offers the alternatives(I) of preventing an idea from calling up a given idea or(2) of making an idea call up an idea other than the idea it spontaneously would call up.

Incisive questions are put as to How the will can prevent an idea from calling up another or How it can introduce into the train an idea not already in the train.

Prevent an idea calling up another it cannot certainly; it avers in the case of inseparable association (as witness color and extension) and it can be supposed that we

have such power only in those cases in which an idea has not an inseparable association with the idea in question but only such an association with it as it has with many others. How again it is asked, some what rhetorically, can we hinder "an idea which has those associations from calling up any of the Ideas with which it is associated?" To strictly prevent an idea is as impossible for the will as to directly produce an idea.

If, then, the mind possesses any power over its train it would seem to be in making an idea call up other ideas than those it would spontaneously excite. But, "if it possesses this power it possesses that also of excluding ideas which would otherwise exist" since a new train of associations must take its origin from the state of consciousness thus produced. It is, therefore, in this if in anything that the power of willing consists" .

But, not even here may the mind arrest or further, for "if the mind cannot will an idea, what power does it possess of introducing an idea into a train but such as comes of its own accord? If it has the idea, it is in the train already. If it has it not, what can it do in order to obtain it? There is the existing train; but how can that be made anything but what it is; or have any associations but those which are already established? "

The forging of the chains thus begun continues: Two familiar processes commonly adduced as examples of the mind's power over its own trains are passed in review, recollection and attention.

Omitting the recollection process as only indirectly relevant to the present subject, we find that according to Mr. Mill, "we seem to have the power of attending or not attending to any object; by which is meant that we will to attend or not to attend. By attending to an object we give it the opportunity of exciting all the ideas with which it is associated. By not attending to it we deprive it of more or less of that opportunity. And if the will has this power over every idea in a train, it has thence a power which may be called unlimited over the train" .

This unlimited power is of course rejected and the real process pointed out. At first sight, we are told, the objects of attention seem to be infinite but when traced to their sources are found to be of two species only: "we attend to Sensation; we attend to Ideas; and there is no other object of attention" .

As objects of attention, sensations are divided into two classes: Indifferent Sensation and Interesting Sensations

by which is meant pleasurable or painful sensations,-

• Indifferent or uninteresting sensations are never for their own sakes, objects of attention. If ever they become objects of attention, it is when they are considered as causes, or signs of interesting sensations; interesting sensations, pleasurable or painful, on the other hand, are of themselves said to fix the attention: the stronger sensation becomes the stronger attention. But as if an implied identification of sensation and attention to it were not enough, he continues, "having a pleasurable or painful sensation and attending to it, seem to be not two things but one and the same thing. The feeling a pain is attending to it; and attending to it is feeling it. The feeling is not one thing and the attention another; the feeling and the attention are the same thing." The stronger the sensation the stronger the attention, the one as involuntary as the other, is only a corollary to this proposition and, if true without qualification there would seem to be no escape into the so-called higher processes of thought.

An important modification, however, removes or attempts

~~to remove the paradox. Ideas are found to subordinate sen~~

sations though in what way ideas ,copies of sensations,at
'tain this power over the originals is not clear.

Here is the account: "Innumerable cases can be adduced
to prove, indeed it forms one of the great features of what
we call the intellectual nature of man, that ideas by their
(b) accumulation are capable of acquiring a power superior to
that of sensations both as pleasure and pain. The pleas-
ure of Taste, the pleasure of Intellectual Exertion, the
pleasure of Virtue acquire when duly cultivated a power
of controlling the solicitation of appetite and are es-
teemed a more valuable constituent of happiness than all
that sense can bestow."

Except the explanation implied in "accumulation of ideas"
the how of this ideal ascendancy is ignored as completely
as the why of the broken chain in motive train of associ-

Possibly ,by 'accumulation of ideas' is meant what Herbart meant by
apperception who holds ,according to Lange's paraphrase, that "Every
simple or complete perception (or sensation) which enters conscious-
ness through the gates of the senses acts upon the ideas present as
a stimulus. It repels everything contrary to it that may
be present in consciousness and recalls all similar things which
now rise with all their connections. . . The stimulated mass of ideas
raised simultaneously resembles an arched vault extending in all di-
rections from a centre. As long as this arching continues the cent-
ral perception has by virtue of its stimulating power, the controll-
ing influence in consciousness. . . . Now a fusion of the new per-
ception takes place with those ideas reproduced anew and standing
high in consciousness, the latter assert or maintain superiority. For
the ideas coming from within are by virtue of their connections
stronger than the single new percept; especially since it diminishes
in power after its stimulating effect is lost."

Lange's Apperception. (Ne Garmo's Ed.) p. 256.

ation.

• An important distinction remains to be made; identification of attention and sensation takes place directly in the case only of ^{interesting} sensations: sensations of the other class variously termed non-interesting, indifferent, of negative feeling tone, have of themselves no such power and must resort to artifices to fix the attention. Hence it is only as they come to be regarded as causes or signs of interesting sensations that they command attention.

How come to be so regarded? Simply thus: "The idea of an interesting sensation is therefore immediately associated with it; the state of consciousness is then not an indifferent sensation merely: it is a sensation and an idea in union. The idea besides is an interesting idea--that of a pain or a pleasure. The union of an interesting idea with an indifferent sensation makes a compound state of consciousness which as a whole is interesting. As the having an interesting sensation and attention to it, are but two names for the same thing; the having a sensation rendered interesting by association and the attention to it cannot be regarded as two different things. In the first case attention is merely a sensation of a particular kind; in the second, it is merely an association of a particular kind."

Ideas, as objects of attention, are subject^{ed} to a similar

division into Indifferent Ideas and Interesting Ideas; the
analysis of attention^{to them} follows that of attention to sensation; with a like identification "attention to an indifferent idea is merely having it; attention to an indifferent idea is merely associating it with some idea that is interesting" and the conclusion of the whole matter is briefly thus: "as far then as Attention gives us power over the trains of our ideas, it is not will which gives it to us but the Occurrence of interesting ideas".

The occurrence of the ideas, we may suppose to be conditioned by their positions in the train: but Whence the interest? Is it too, cognitive and does it as an idea of pleasure or of pain take its place among other ideas and fusing with some lend them an interest denied to others or just what is interest and what does it imply? Possibly both interest and desire contain elements irreducible to ideas, single or en train and difficult of explanation on the "bundle of sensations" theory of mind.

It is a bald statement of Attention that is put forth in the Analysis and such as would receive important modification by some modern adherents of the theory but bears nevertheless a striking family resemblance to one wing of

Modern Psychology . Of chief interest in the present connection is the reaction against the mechanical philosophy which has set in in the camp itself. Various attempts have been made to free the self from the tyranny of its own trains and presentations, but more laudable yet as a motive is the truth-loving attempt to bring into accord with facts of observation and experience, facts of introspection among which the feeling of the freedom of the self in a part of its own inner activities is the most obstinate.

Evidence for such freedom has been sought where association seems to break down in its explanation. Deliberation, Attention, Feeling of Effort, known both to inner and outer observation as stadia of moral action have been thought to evidence Self-activity, a certain, if limited, amount of Self-determination.

"As far then as Attention gives us power over the trains of our ideas it is not will which gives it but the occurrence of interesting ideas" concludes James Mill in his analysis of Attention. It will be noted that he does not deny the fact itself of the arrest of trains of association but offered the explanation which seemed most congruous with the theory of trains and most reasonable to him-

self. His account of Attention was, however, by his son regarded as inadequate, who after amplifying in a note certain parts of this account adds in distinct contradiction to a part of it that "ideas which are not of themselves so painful or pleasurable as to fix the attention may have the attention fixed on them by a voluntary act, In other words the will has power over the attention" and himself asking the question, How is this act of will excited and in what does it consist? replies that like all other voluntary acts it is excited by a motive, by the desire of some end, that is of something pleasurable: "What happens is that the idea on which we are said to fix our attention, not being of itself sufficiently pleasurable to fix it spontaneously we form an association between it and an other pleasurable idea and the result is that the attention is fixed... .. There is no other possible means of fixing it." but since it might be objected that the above accounts only for cases in which voluntary attention flows easy and unimpeded, almost as if spontaneous, he supplemented this account by supposing a case in which the mind still wanders from the thought and when there is required a "supplementary force of will in aid of association; an effort which suspends energy and is often both painful and exhausting".

ing". What then takes place? Why in this case as in every case the will is called into action by a motive. The motive like all other motives is a desire. The desire (still undefined) must be either the same desire which was already felt but made more effectual than before or another idea superadded to the first. The former case it would seem presupposes the latter for "the desire which was not sufficient to fix the attention firmly on that which is the means of its fulfilment cannot be sufficient to call forth the voluntary effort necessary for fixing it; some other desire must come to its assistance.

Do we ask what other desire? the answer is ready: the "desire of a different state of our own desires."

Whether this supplementary analysis signifies Determinism or Indeterminism it seems in any case to assign attention to an Ideational Source and if one may judge from the phrase "desire of a different state of our own desires" to quite a remote Ideational source. But without forcing "activity" upon an unwilling "Subject", one may read between the lines of both the main and the supplementary analysis some of the difficulties which the law of association has to meet as explanatory of attention.

Although attempts have been made ,it is true, to meet these difficulties --to cut the Gordian knot by including in the associative forces ,emotional and volitional elements as its "essential accompaniment" or "condition of realization",or more distinctly to beg the question by giving to sensation the new quality of "feeling Tone" which is to render them interesting and at the same time independent of any subject other than masses of themselves which synthesizing into a prevailing Tone of Feeling ,constitutes the Ego -yet so real have the difficulties been felt to be,and so insufficient the attempts to meet them that in the absence ,so far as known of a physical basis of attention,Association,mental concomitant of molecular movement along cerebral tracts laid by sensation,- has been declared inadequate to the task of accounting for it and as explanation has been relegated to the subordinate processes of Sensation and Retention,both of which it seems admirably adapted to explain. The latter processes conditioned,it is admitted,by the senses and the brain are characterized by a certain passivity and follow,it

may be assumed Psychophysical laws:but processes ,not so-
conditioned so far as known and which when operative hin-
der rather than further Associative Reproduction,cannot
be assumed to follow the same laws. A marked difference
in processes justify the assumption of a difference in un-
derlying principles.

Such a difference appears,it is thought, in the phenome-
na of Attention and it is exhibited in the power which "we
seem to have over our ^r trains of association",either when
we seem to arrest them by holding in consciousness one
link of such a train to the neglect of others or when we
seem to break through the serried ranks of association,to
select,isolate,and recombine into new wholes,elements ori-
ginally in either simultaneous or successive contiguity.

These are new powers,not for the first time,it is true,
observable,but for the first time clearly dominant over
the merely acquisitive power of association,and to account
for these new powers of arrest,activity,and selection,a
new inner principle of Apperception ,an inborn spontaneous
"conceiving activity" is assumed which as reborn Kantian
Apperception becomes in turn the "suffiction" of Psychol-
ogy.

"To view attention" says Hamilton, "as a special act of intelligence and to distinguish it from consciousness is utterly inept. . . Attention is consciousness and something more. It is consciousness voluntarily applied under its law of limitation to some determinate object: it is ⁺ consciousness concentrated."

Consciousness he furthermore compares to a telescope; attention to the pulling out and in of the tubes, accommodating the focus to the object.

Strangely enough much the same figure is caught up by Wundt as expressive of the facts of Attention or Apperception. For taking consciousness figuratively as an inner seeing he conceives all concepts or perceptions present at one moment to be within the field of vision of consciousness while only one is in the focus of consciousness. ⁽²⁾ The entrance of an idea into the field of vision is Perception; into the focus of vision is Apperception. Hence apperception is shown in the high degree of clearness acquired by a concept or image, -- but (and here is the point of divergence) in order to the attainment of this clearness a definite psychical action is necessary. A given im

Den Eintritt einer Vorstellung in das innere Blickfeld wollen wir die Perception, ihren Eintritt in den Blickpunkt die Apperception nennen. Grundzüge der Phys. Psych. Vol. II. 236.: see also sq/238.

age ,present with others in consciousness must be seized upon according to Wundt and brought into greater clearness and this is done by attention. For the will, (See Lange's paraphrase of Wundt, 276) must be defined as a conceiving activity in consciousness which activity in the course of our inner states acts determinatively and calls forth corresponding outer movements. Hence apperception is an act of volition, a determination of the will upon the ideas.

"No apperception without activity of the will," says Lange and it is always the one will that is expressed in all forms of apperception.

"Apperception is the activity of our will in the realm of our ideas" is Wundt's own definition "and only in this activity do we feel the unity of our volition".

That so fundamental a psychical function must exercise a far reaching control in the realm of thought was without doubt clearly present to the mind of the elder Mill when in rejecting the mind's power over its own trains he wrote "if the ^{will} has this power over every idea in a train

x This law is , that the greater the number of objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously extended the smaller is the intensity with which it is able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct will be the information it obtains of the several objects.

it has thence a power which may be called unlimited over the train".

What then is the peculiar power exercised by Apperception? "Combination is the element and the only element (says Kant, Watson's Ed. p. 64) that cannot be given by the object". So also Wundt as paraphrased by Lange (p. 276.): "Without apperception our concepts would resemble scattered members wanting a unifying element; they would be incapable of entering into association with one another. For it is an erroneous supposition that percepts and concepts are combined by means of their contents, or their inner and outer relation. That which combines them is apperception.

The principle of Apperception, inasmuch as it has no known physical basis or correlate is in so far spiritual: active and characterized by a power of selection or choice; it is in its very nature volitional; and just as will involves motive so apperception is in all its forms characterized by motive and as supreme over association moulds to its own Ideal purposes the material furnished it by association even as association itself (as passive apperception) links certain only of the mass of elemental ideas

furnished by sensation.

Association, it is allowed, furnishes the material for the higher principle and in so doing determines the number of combinations possible to be made, but it is apperception alone which can determine which of that number of possible combinations shall be effected. Association may be said to move from without inward, while apperception works from within outward, its products being not reproductions but Ideal Constructions. The processes are, in fact, interdependent, all higher thought involving both. Nor must it be supposed that Apperception, because clearly dominant first only in attention is therefore absent from the lower processes. So far is this from being the case, it may be said that it appears with the dawn of consciousness.. It is a peculiarity of consciousness, according to James (Vol. Ip. 284) that it is always interested more in one part of its object than in another and welcomes or rejects or chooses all the while it thinks, accentuation and emphasis being present in every perception that we have.

the world,

For each of us, we are told, "Our world lies embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations which gave the mere matter to the thought of all of us indifferently."

Over which primordial chaos of sensations ,we may infer the Apperceptive principle broods much as in the Hebrew conception the Spirit brooded over the Chaos of Genesis immanent perhaps in all but manifesting itself clearly only late and in the higher forms of consciousness.

The Apperception present in Association is of course, passive; according to Wundt "so long as apperception is active in the field of associative combination of ideas, so long as it contributes to the formation of elementary mental structure i.e. complexions and complications, groups and series of ideas its character as an action of volition does not appear. Here ideas are apperceiving combined without one's becoming conscious of the assistance of the will. This Wundt attributes to the fact that here the will is determined "univocally by perceptions entering consciousness that is to say one perception is so distinguished by intensity, emotional tone, that the apperception of other is quite out of the question. Hence we think that we are guided by outer influences or by our reproduction and not by our will." This form of apperception is passive and may form one term of an equation :consciousness equals Apperception.

But the full dignity of Apperception appears only in

~~its active form, when it is no longer guided~~ "univocally by ideas that are raised by association" but when on the

basis laid by association it proceeds to the formation of judgments, logical and other, - "when not one but several ideas are at its disposal among which it can choose."

Choice brings us again to the region of motive or Will: and here it is to be noted that as in reflex action, lower motive power (by courtesy only called motive) exhibits an almost mathematical proportion or correspondence (Witness Weber's Law) between motive and action, so lower motive in the sphere of the Intellect exhibits a similar correspondence.

And as motive to action in the sense of "final cause" exhibits no such correspondence but works under a different law, where the proportion may be indirect, so the higher law of logical, aesthetic and Ethical processes work; it may be inferred, ^{laws} under ^t higher than those of association.

It is in this higher region of thought that ^{it is continued} the will is "free", not in the sense of obeying no law but as obeying a law which is not Psychophysical.

Having brought the Apperceptive process up to the ^{as proofs of freedom} origin of Ethical motive, "Innervation feelings" and the existence of a physical apperceptive centre may be allowed to fall into the background.

Closely connected with the phenomena of Attention and exhibiting a disproportion between energy of motive and energy of action similar to that shown in the Apperceptive process is the Feeling of Effort--a feeling once dim and muscular but now made luminous and Moral by a light-bringing Phoebus who finds in it much that is peripheral in origin and obedient to the law of mechanical activity--action in line of least resistance but something also exceptional, "central" in origin and obedient, if to law, to a law Ideal and counter to the mechanical-action in line of the greatest resistance.

In those dim old days when Philosophy and Psychology were not divided and psychologic analysis yet introspective it was said that it is from our voluntary exertion in producing effects that "our very conception or idea of active power and of efficient cause is derived and that, if we were not conscious of such exertion we should have no conception at all of cause"--a view objected to by Hamilton on the ground that it gave over the universal and necessary notion of causality to an empirical derivation which were a surrendering to the enemy he could not allow, and yet he himself admitted it to be true "that the

1) Reid's Active Powers. p.604.

2) Ibid. Note

consciousness of our own efficiency illumines the dark notion of causality . . . and raises it from a vague and negative to a precise and positive notion of power."

This illumination of the dark notion of causality was, however of short duration, doomed to be shadowed speedily by Hume's declaration that we have no such conception as that of efficient cause or of active power "because efficiency and active power are not ideas of Sensation or Reflection", of which alone we are conscious and that in speaking or thinking of causality as a power we are deceived inasmuch as we are conscious in that phenomena only of a sequence of events. But "the very dispute", reports Reid, "whether we have the conception of an efficient cause , shows that we have. For though men may dispute about what has no existence they cannot dispute about things of which they have no conception."

This profitless dispute, begun by metaphysician and continued in their own way , was passed on to the psychologists, and soon Introspection was cumbered or lightened as the case may be, by physiological considerations.

In differing with his father on the subject of At-

A similar argument is noticed by Mill (Ex. p. 245.) as brought forward in support of the existence of matter which is summed up by him as "proved, it might be said, by the possibility of believing it."

tention J. S. Mill distinctly recognized the feeling of Effort as an accompaniment if not an essential of Will: in fixing the wandering attention there is, he says, in words already quoted, "required a supplementary force of will in aid of association, an effort which suspends energy and is often both painful and exhausting"..and again in speaking of "desire" which in harmony with his father, he held to be the distinguishing mark of volition, he reverts to effort and as if by way of explanation says, "It will be asked whence the sense of laborious effort and subsequent feeling of fatigue which are experienced when the attention does not fix itself spontaneously but is fixed with more or less difficulty by a voluntary act? I conceive them to be in consequence of the prolongation of the state of unsatisfied desire. That state whatever view the psychologist takes of it is a condition of the brain and nerves having physiological consequences of great importance and drawing largely on that stock of what we call nervous energy, - any unusual expenditure or deficiency of which produces the feeling of exhaustion. The waste of energy and the subsequent exhaustion are greater when the desire seems continually on the point of obtaining its

gratification but the gratification constantly eludes it"

So much in the same vein is Bain's explanation: "If with a strong motive there is weakness or insufficiency of the active organs we have the peculiar consciousness named Effort. . . It is the nature of a voluntary act to be accompanied with consciousness. The feeling that constitutes the motive is one form, to which is added the consciousness of active exertion which varies with the condition of the organs as compared with the demand made upon them, one of its phases being the state of Effort."

"The consciousness of Effort, like deliberation" he concludes with insistence, "is an accident and not an essential of the Will."

But accidents are pregnant things and to chivalrous knights of Freedom no more unworthy espousal than Chance or dim-eyed Possibility; accident in the present case is in danger of losing its accidental character, if Effort be considered the culmination of desire and desire itself an essential of the Will.

However, granting it an accident, the coupling of Effort and Deliberation in the above conclusion, is significant and points the way analysis was going, - otherwise, perhaps its character as essential would not have demanded express denial.

See dilemma of Determinism, where pluralism, possibilities, and Chance are "accidentally and necessarily accepted" with that implies

As in the case of Deliberation, it is not the fact of Deliberation that is doubted or denied, but its interpretation that varies; so it is the interpretation of the feeling of Effort that is the question of interest and at issue. The latter question formulates itself in much the same way as the former: Is it centrally initiated or peripherally excited or both? is the question Has it or not a physical basis?

Without touching here upon the complicated theory of "Innervation Feelings" or going even lightly into the respective merits of innervation feelings and kinaesthetic images as the "last psychic antecedents and determinants of the currents downward to the muscles from the brain"; it is sufficient for the purpose in hand to keep in mind of feeling that of the three theories as to the origin of Effort, one that of the central origin of such feelings which as espoused by Wundt, the Apperceptionist might prejudice in its favor the mind of a partizan of Freedom, - has been rejected by Professor James of Harvard, espouser as he is of Moral Freedom and Effort as a proof of it, and been declared by him in no equivocal terms an assumption and an unnecessary assumption inasmuch as kinaesthetic images

are a sufficient explanation of the phenomena, if indeed we may not dispense with them in time after the early stages of acquisition of movement. The theory of innervation feelings labors, he holds, under the further disadvantage of having no direct introspective evidence for it and much that is faulty of indirect, circumstantial evidence.

So much was shown in the monograph of "Feeling of Effort" and the conclusion from the point of view of Science is that the consciousness of muscular exertion being impossible without movement effected somewhere, must be an afferent and not an efferent sensation: a consequence and not an antecedent of the movement itself" and therefore the "entire content and material of our consciousness, - consciousness of movement as of all things, are thus of peripheral origin and came to us, in the first instance, through the peripheral nerves"--a sensationalist conclusion that that falls in admirably with Sir W. Hamilton's Law of Parcimony and is a gain at any rate in Simplicity and Uniformity (Vol. I p. 519.).

If a little startled by this avowal of sensationalism from an apostle of Freedom, confidence is soon restored; for "let there be no such consciousness" (of discharge from a motor center into a motor nerve as the theory of Innervation demands); "let all our thought of movements be of sensational constitution; still in the emphasizing, choos

ing, espousing of one of them rather than another, in the saying to it 'be thou the reality for me' there is ample scope for our inward initiation to be shown".

"Here", he continues, "it seems to me the true line between such ideas as are connected with the outgoing and such as are connected with the incoming neural wave."

Let then our thoughts of movements be of sensational constitution, What happens? Sensations of movement leave behind memory images of themselves which as Ideas of action resident or remote, become the "mental cue" of subsequent movements.

In images, resident or remote one recognizes new names for old ideas; in the resident, Mill's obscure idea or internal feeling of the act; and in the remote, his obvious idea or outward appearance of the act; and keeping this in view it is not difficult to catch an undercurrent of Mill in such statements as "At the outset of learning movement, the resident predominate, later the remote play the greater role... and the idea of the end tending more and more to make itself all-sufficient."

If for James the resident kinaesthetic ideas are so swamped by the vivid kinaesthetic feelings by which they are immediately overtaken that we have no time to be aware of their separate existence; for Mill the obscure ideas

are so swallowed up by the mass of associations as to furnish the most remarkable instance of that class of links in a chain which how important soever to the existence of the chain are passed over so quickly that the existence of them is hardly ever recognized.

Whatever, then, may be the function of resident, kinaesthetic images, their use like that of obscure ideas lapses in time and as the obvious idea, so the idea of end (resident or remote) supplants it as immediate antecedent of action and tends as has been said to make itself all-sufficient. Thus it happens that what precedes a voluntary movement is not Innervation feelings or the thoughts of such feelings but is "the anticipation of the movement's sensible effects, resident or remote." (Psychology Vol. II 519)

"Is then the bare idea of the movement's sensible effect its sufficient mental cue" asks James, "or must there be an additional mental antecedent in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate or other synonymous phenomena of consciousness before the movement can follow?"

The first point to start from, he decides (Vol. I p. 526.) in understanding voluntary action and the possible occurrence of it with no fiat or express resolve is the fact that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive (as it

inhibitive and selective). "We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling that we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its way to instigate a movement. The common notion that this is not the case, that consciousness as such is not the forerunner of activity but that activity must result from some superadded "will-force," is an inference based on those special cases where an act ^{is} thought of for an indefinite time without the action taking place. ^{But-} These [special] cases are not the norm; they are cases of inhibition by antagonistic thoughts ^{and} may be termed a blocking of the natural course of the stream of thought. "When the blocking is released we feel as if an inward spring were let loose: this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which the act effectively succeeds, of which our higher thought is full.

But when there is no such blocking, there is no hiatus between the thought process and the motor discharge. Movement is, in fact, ["]the immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may be: it is so in reflex action; it is so in emotional expression; it is so in voluntary life."



Ideo-motor action is not, therefore, in the view of James, as in that of the originator of the term, a curiosity of mental life but its norm, the "type of all conscious action and that from which one must start to explain action in which a special fiat is involved,--fiat or negat as the case may be, since inhibition and execution have not different but the same or similar antecedents in the matter of express effort or command. Either of them may require it, but in all simple and ordinary cases just as the presence of one idea prompts a movement, so the bare presence of another idea will prevent its taking place. The idea of the movement is its sufficient antecedent.

Such being the type of all conscious action, it is not surprising that "the immense majority of human decisions are decisions without Effort" and that of the five types of decision enumerated by James two only should be found characterized by it. That the majority of decisions are without effort is due, it is true, to the impulsive quality of consciousness but a "certain intensity of consciousness is required for its impulsiveness" to be completely effective.

~~Since there are remarkable differences in the power of~~

of different sorts of consciousness to excite movements, the intensity of some feeling is "practically apt to be below the discharging point, while that of others is apt to be above it..... There thus results great possibilities of alteration in the actual impulsive efficacy of particular motives compared to others. It is where the normally less efficacious motive becomes more efficacious and the normally more efficacious one, less so that action^s ordinarily effort-less or abstinences ordinarily easy, either become impossible, or one effected, if at all, by the expenditure of effort."

There is then a certain normal ratio in the impulsive power of different sorts of motive which is "de-parted from only at exceptional times or by exceptional individuals." The state of mind possessing normally the most impulsive quality being those of the reactive consciousness while those possessing less or no impulsive power are those expressive of "far off considerations" abstract conceptions, "unaccustomed reasons and motives foreign to the instinctive history of the race." The latter "prevail when they do prevail with effort", and the normal "sphere of Effort is thus found wherever non-instinctive motives to behaviour are to rule the day." The sense of effort comes, in short, whenever a rarer or more Ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive

kind and this it does whenever "strongly explosive tendencies are checked or strongly obstructive conditions over come. . . .As when outer forces impinge upon a body we say that the resultant motion is in the line of least resistance or of the greatest traction so it is a curious fact that our spontaneous language never speaks of volition with effort in this way; for we feel in all cases of volition as if the line taken, when the rarer and more ideal motives prevail were the line of the greatest Resistance and as if the line of coarse motivation were the more pervious and easy one, even at the very moment when we refuse to follow it"

of Feeling of Effort

Professor James in the above account has been allowed to speak for himself mainly for the reason that it is impossible to paraphrase James ^{or} to escape the fascination of his stream of thought and diction and put out on an independent course with the face from the light.

It is plain, however, that there is again struck here an indeterminate element and a violation of the ratio observed in ordinary matter-of-fact volition.

That the swaying of Ethical considerations is present here cannot be doubted because it is avowed, but it is a swaying in deference to facts of Introspection and to

the Demands of Rational Consciousness.

V.

As in emphasizing the doctrine of Free-will Pelagius was accounted in his time and Arminius in his, the less religious and as Kant in postulating an unconditioned Moral Law whose essence is Freedom, is now held to have suffered a philosophical aberration, -so it may be prophesied that in making a place for Freedom in a system of psychology, Wundt, James and other seers into the unseen will be thought in the future to have subtracted something from the scientific character of their work.

It may, moreover, be objected that the truth they represent, if any, is an ever diminishing quantity (Indeterminism being equal to unknown Determinants) and that in the hands of Experimentalists it is rapidly reaching zero as its limit.

The advance of Determinism upon Indeterminism resembles it is true the mighty strides of Achilles in pursuit of the little Tortoise but with this difference that in the one case Common Consciousness declares that the distance

must become zero; in the other it declares that the distance never can become zero. Is the Common Consciousness in both cases mistaken, or is there, as in protoplasm, something subtilely elusive in the linking of the element of Moral Life?

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